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INTRODUCTION
There are few issues that excite lawyers and law students more than same-
sex marriage recognition. The sheer drama of the issue is hard to match. A
generation ago, so-called "homosexuals" cowered in the closet, hated or
scorned by most Americans and fearful that any open relationship would lead
to loss of employment, social ostracism, loss of professional license (including
the license to practice law), police harassment, and possibly even
imprisonment and rape within prison. Today, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) Americans in states like Massachusetts face little or no
state discrimination and enjoy all the same legal rights and duties as straight
persons. That equality extends to civil marriage in Massachusetts and eight
other states, as well as the District of Columbia.' Another ten states recognize
civil unions or their rough equivalent for same-sex couples.2
LGBT people have moved from outlaws to in-laws in a generation. That is
as dramatic a change in fundamental social attitudes as this nation has ever
seen. For lawyers, the gay rights movement ranks alongside the civil rights and
women's rights movements as one of the landmark social movements of the
last century. Like those previous social movements, the gay rights movement
has contributed to the ongoing transformation of family law and has
successfully deployed constitutional litigation, as well as legislation to advance
its agenda. Unlike the civil rights and women's rights movements, however,
most marriage equality litigation has been carried out under state constitutions
rather than the U.S. Constitution, though that is rapidly changing. The gay
marriage analog to the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Loving v.
Virginia3 is the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 2003 decision in
Goodridge v. Department ofPublic Health.4
This Article will provide an account of this constitutional success story but
will also analyze a cautionary narrative. Specifically, I shall consider Gerald
I As of March 2013, jurisdictions granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples are, in
order of their action, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, the
District of Columbia, New York, Maryland, Washington, and Maine. See NAT'L CTR. FOR
LESBIAN RIGHTS, MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, AND CIVIL UNIONS: AN OvERVIEW
OF RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 1-2
(2012).
2 As of 2013, states recognizing civil unions or domestic partnerships with all the same
rights and duties of marriage include, in order of their action, California, Colorado, New
Jersey, Oregon, Nevada, Illinois, Delaware, Hawaii, and Rhode Island. Wisconsin
recognizes domestic partnerships that do not give all the rights and benefits of marriage. See
id. at 2-3; Lynn Bartels, Colorado Civil Unions Bill Signed by Gov. John Hickenlooper at
History Colorado Center, DENVERPOST.COM, http://www.denverpost.comibreakingnews/ci_2
2841921/colorado-civil-unions-hickenlooper-takes-up-pen-sign (last updated Mar. 22, 2013,
8:30 AM).
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring state bars to different-race marriages unconstitutional).
4 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (interpreting the Massachusetts Constitution to require
marriage equality for lesbian and gay couples).
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Rosenberg's thesis that courts cannot effect social change, a thesis Professor
Rosenberg has extended to the marriage equality litigation.
5 His general
argument is that "courts can almost never be effective producers of significant
social reform. At best, they can second the social reform acts of the other
branches of government."6 Consistent with conventional wisdom among legal
academics, Rosenberg maintains that courts have neither the capacity nor the
legitimacy to craft and implement complicated and far-reaching changes in
social policy.7 His more distinctive point is that when courts innovate through
recognition of important constitutional rights, they are not only ineffectual but
counterproductive, because they deflect social movement energy from more
productive channels and produce "backlash" from energized
countermovements.8
Thus, in the 2008 edition of his book, Hollow Hope, Rosenberg argued that
Goodridge and other state court decisions were incomplete "victories" that left
lesbian and gay couples with only some of the thousands of marital rights
enjoyed by married heterosexual couples.
9 A primary reason for this was
backlash: "As a result of litigation, same-sex marriage proponents face
legislative and constitutional obstacles on both the state and federal level that
did not exist before they turned to litigation," including the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted as a direct response to Hawaii's constitutional
litigation.' 0 While acknowledging that one might consider the combined results
as "two steps forward, one step back," Rosenberg considered the results to be
more accurately described as "one step forward, two steps back."
1
5 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 339-419 (2d ed. 2008) (extending the thesis of the book's earlier edition to the
marriage equality decisions in Hawaii (1993), Vermont (1999), and Massachusetts (2003-
2004)).
6 Id. at 422.
1 This longstanding wisdom is pursued more thoroughly by NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 123-50 (1994), and can be traced back at least as far as CARL A. AUERBACH ET AL.,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE,
EXECUTIVE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1961) (considering workplace injuries as a
problem courts are ill-equipped to tackle and exploring legislative and administrative
alternatives).
I ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 427.
9 Id. at 352.
10 Id. at 365, 368.
" Id. at 368; see also Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in
All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 813 (2006) (arguing that marriage equality
would have advanced more quickly if the social movement lawyers had never brought their
cases or had lost all of them). For related versions of the highly pessimistic backlash thesis
in this context, see John D'Emilio, The Marriage Fight Is Setting Us Back, 2006 GAY &
LESBIAN REV. WORLDWIDE 10-11 (lamenting the LGBT rights movement's over-reliance on
courts); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV.
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Professor Rosenberg's learned analysis has been subjected to strong
critique. My colleagues, Professors Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegel, for
example, take Rosenberg and other backlash theorists to task for their analysis
of Roe v. Wade, which those theorists read as creating a tidal wave of pro-life
opposition to a woman's right to choose abortion. One problem with this
reading is that it gives too much weight to people's post hoc verbal responses
to the abortion cases and invokes as examples of "backlash" events and
developments that are better understood as complicated examples of normal
politics. 12 The Greenhouse-Siegel point raises a deeper criticism, one that I
pursue in this Article: neither Rosenberg nor his critics have articulated a
theory that distinguishes "backlash" from "normal" politics. This Article
suggests such a theory and then applies it to litigation advancing marriage
equality. Contrary to Rosenberg, I conclude that constitutional litigation has
significantly advanced the cause of marriage equality,' 3 but that such litigation
advances the cause only if litigators minimize the risk of significant backlash,
as the primary "movement" organizations have done.14
Part I begins with a brief history placing marriage equality litigation into its
proper institutional context. Before 1999, constitutional marriage equality
litigation tended to be disconnected from political grass-roots organizing and,
as a result, was uniformly unsuccessful. The most successful litigation, in
Hawaii, also yielded the worst backlash. Starting with the Vermont marriage
litigation, however, constitutional politics has grown increasingly (but far from
completely) indistinguishable from normal politics - which has correlated with
greater success for marriage equality.
431, 459-73 (2005) (applying Rosenberg's backlash thesis to the Massachusetts marriage
decision); and Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1153, 1217-23 (2009) (applying Rosenberg's
backlash thesis to the California marriage decision, and contrasting it with California's 1948
decision requiring recognition of interracial marriages, which produced much less backlash).
12 Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028,2076-86 (2011).
13 For some thoughtful critical responses to the backlash literature as applied to marriage
equality litigation, I have learned the most from Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime,
Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1235 (2010), and Thomas M. Keck,
Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 L. &
Soc'y REv.- 151 (2009). See also Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex
Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1493 (2006); Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the
Courts, 54 DRAKE L. REv. 861 (2006).
14 By LGBT "movement" organizations, I am thinking of Gay and Lesbian Advocates
and Defenders (GLAD); Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund; the American Civil
Liberties Union; and ad hoc but well-organized groups of experienced and dedicated LGBT
litigators and their allies who came together to litigate marriage equality in Vermont,
California, and other states.
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Part II advances a theory of backlash that distinguishes it from normal
politics. The politics of backlash is a politics where people invest their
identities and often their feelings of disgust into particular preferences. Thus,
identity politics that fuels important social movements such as the civil rights
movement and, now, the LGBT rights movement, is a phenomenon where
identity is an important motivator on both sides. If the LGBT rights movement
engages in a politics of state recognition of the dignity of gay and
transgendered people, its aspirations are met with resistance by individuals
whose identity is formed in substantial part by the negation of full equality for
those seeking it. To the extent the countermovement is motivated in a
significant way by a politics of disgust, backlash will be intense and potentially
violent. To the extent that the countermovement is motivated only by identity-
based concerns, backlash will still be intense but not as hysterical and
potentially violent.
The politics of backlash, as I am using the term, is risky for the polity as a
whole and must be managed very carefully. To the extent a newly aggressive
minority group triggers a politics of disgust, the polity needs to move slowly
and incrementally as it recognizes the just claims of the minority. An
immediate recognition of complete equality when the nation is intensely and
hysterically divided could be disastrous for the political system as a whole.
Even as the politics of disgust wanes, the body politic needs to be attentive to
the divisiveness that identity politics creates on both sides. Although judicially
recognized equality is not always more divisive than legislatively recognized
equality, there is a particular danger that judges will move too fast in response
to legitimate demands by the despised minority.
On the whole, the judiciary has managed the issue of marriage equality
maturely and productively. Specifically, Part III sets forth the positive and
underappreciated ways that courts have contributed to the advancement of
marriage equality since 1999. I agree with Professor Rosenberg that a
premature victory for marriage equality in the Hawaii courts from 1993 to
1996 was a mixed blessing, but I disagree with his assessment of the Vermont
and Massachusetts marriage cases. I shall conclude with a discussion of
subsequent marriage equality developments in light of the theory of backlash
politics developed in this Article.
I. COURTS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY, 1970-2012
Traditionally, the state has not issued marriage licenses to lesbian and gay
couples, but after the Stonewall riots of 1969 thousands of such couples came
out of the closet and demanded that states recognize their relationships as
marriages or some other type of legal union.'5 Some of these couples brought
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of their exclusion from civil
marriage. Starting in the 1990s, gay rights organizations and litigation groups
15 ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSET & INTO THE CouRTs: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY
STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 23-25 (2005).
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started planning a more systematic campaign for family law equality; these
institutions worked both the political and the judicial process to advance these
equality goals. In the twenty-first century, several litigation campaigns actually
delivered marriage equality in different states. A number of books and dozens
of law review articles have examined the people and issues involved in the
marriage equality constitutional lawsuits.16 I refer the interested reader to the
detailed accounts provided by this existing scholarship.
16 See, e.g., id. at 175-218 (Hawaii, Vermont, Alaska, and Massachusetts marriage
litigation); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF GAY RIGHTS 43-82 (2002) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE] (Vermont
marriage litigation); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 42-50 (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE] (Hawaii and District of Columbia marriage litigation, with
discussion of pre-1990 litigation); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & DARREN SPEDALE, GAY
MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 21-31
(2006) (Minnesota, Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts marriage litigation); JAMES E.
FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES
181-98, 218-23 (2012) (Vermont, California, Massachusetts, and New York marriage
litigation); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 48-155 (2012) (Hawaii, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Iowa, and Maine marriage litigation); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX,
DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 114-48 (2006)
(DOMA and state marriage nonrecognition statutes); MICHAEL MELLO, LEGALIZING GAY
MARRIAGE (2004) (Vermont marriage litigation); YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES 217-27 (2002) (Hawaii, Vermont, Alaska, and Massachusetts marriage litigation);
DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 25-30, 41-45 (2006)
(Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts marriage litigation).
For articles and symposia analyzing particular state marriage equality litigation
campaigns, see, in order of the development of the campaigns they address, Symposium,
Same-Sex Marriage: The Debate in Hawai'i and the Nation, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (2000)
(Hawaii marriage litigation); Kevin G. Clarkson, David Orgon Coolidge & William C.
Duncan, The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's Choice on the Last Frontier, 16
ALASKA L. REV. 213 (1999) (Alaska marriage litigation); A Symposium on Vermont's Civil
Unions, 25 VT. L. REV. 1 (2000) (Vermont marriage litigation); Mary L. Bonauto,
Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2005) (Massachusetts marriage
litigation); Edward Stein, The Story of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health: The
Bumpy Road to Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 27 (Carol Sanger
ed., 2007) (Massachusetts marriage litigation); Arthur S. Leonard, New York Recognition of
a Legal Status for Same-Sex Couples: A Rapidly Developing Story, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
479 (2010) (New York marriage litigation); Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 13
(California marriage litigation); William N. Eskridge Jr., Foreword: The Marriage Cases,
Reversing the Burden ofInertia in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV.
1785 (2009) [hereinafter Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage Cases] (California marriage
litigation under the state constitution); and Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sarah Hinger & Keren
Zwick, Equality Opportunity: Marriage Litigation and Iowa's Equal Protection Law, 12 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 107 (2008) (Iowa marriage litigation).
2013] BACKLASH POLITICS AND MARRIAGE EQUALITY
The project of this Article is to situate the marriage equality movement
within the larger context of social movement transformation of public law.
Drawing from earlier work on social movements, I posit three stages for this
movement.17 At each stage, constitutional litigation played important but
different roles, and marriage equality victories carried with them vastly
different consequences.
In Stage 1 - which took place from roughly 1970 through 1996 for sexual
and gender minorities - the minority seeks to end active state persecution of its
members and to secure some measure of equal treatment in American public
life, but without substantial success.18 Initially, the majority responds to this
nascent politics of recognition with reflexive fear and alarm that a disparaged
minority has the asperity to seek a place at the table of American public life.
The early responses to marriage equality litigation in the 1970s and 1980s were
classic responses along these lines. That is, they were typically hysterical,
knee-jerk responses by the majority, with at best tautological reasoning, that
were expressive reaffirmations of traditional cultural identities - for example,
"homosexual marriage" is wrong because marriage must be heterosexual.
When Hawaii's supreme court suggested that gay marriage might be
recognized in that state, there was a powerful local backlash and a ferocious
national one that set back the marriage equality movement in many respects.'
9
In Stage 2 - which took place from roughly 1996 through 2008 for sexual
and gender minorities - the minority engages in a full-throated politics of
recognition, which calls forth from the majority a full-throated politics of
preservation; the politics of culture clashes characterizes this period.
20 Inspired
by the Hawaii litigation's vision of marriage equality, gay marriage activists in
other states engaged in more clever institutional strategies and enjoyed greater
public attention to the increasing number of committed lesbian and gay
couples, many of them raising children.21 Although the movement made major
advances, these developments consistently triggered significant backlashes as
the traditionalist countermovement remained potent and engaged.
In Stage 3 - which began after 2008 for sexual and gender minorities - the
minority's politics of recognition gains a great deal of traction among the
public at large, and that normative success transforms the political environment
into one where "normal" politics increasingly overshadows "backlash"
"1 See William N. Eskridge Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 419, 467-78 (2001) (laying out three stages for social
movements reflected in the history of the civil rights, women's rights, and gay rights
movements).
8 See id. at 468-71.
* See id. at 474.
20 See id. at 471-74.
21 See Cummings & Neiaime, supra note 13, at 1251-80 (detailing the strategy taken by
California gay rights advocates in the wake of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993),
and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
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politics.22 California's Proposition 8 referendum,23 which marriage equality
supporters narrowly lost, was a campaign where normal politics was starting to
overtake backlash politics. At the national level, the reelection of President
Barack Obama in 2012 was a landmark event for gay marriage. The President
embraced marriage equality without triggering much of a backlash,2 4 and the
move helped him in the realm of normal politics as well.
A. Stage 1, Uphill Struggles: 1970-1996
One distinctive feature of litigation is that anyone who can find a willing
lawyer has effective access to the judiciary and can demand that judges apply
established legal and constitutional principles to new issues, such as same-sex
marriage. Marriage license clerks can simply tell lesbian and gay couples that
they do not qualify for a license, and legislators can ignore their petitions, but
judges have to explain why committed lesbian and gay couples do not have the
same civil-marriage rights and duties as straight couples. For a minority whose
members were socially disparaged and politically toxic, courts were virtually
the only forums where minority group members can seek decent treatment
from the state.
Starting in 1971, isolated couples proud to be gay or lesbian marched into
state courts, but that did not mean they could succeed even in that forum. For a
generation, state judges told those couples that the state could exclude them
from civil marriage: The reasons do not sound cogent today, because they were
grounded in attitudes that are no longer universally held. Like most other
Americans, judges believed that lesbian and gay couples were the opposite of
family for a variety of reasons: they could not procreate and they did not form
serious relationships similar to marriage with children.25 According to the
courts, discrimination was treating similar people differently, not treating
different people, the "homosexuals," differently from "normal" people, the
"heterosexuals."
Indeed, there was a deeper reason, not openly articulated by judges, for their
universal rejection of marriage equality claims before 1993. Most states
criminalized the sexual conduct, consensual sodomy, that would consummate a
gay marriage.26 Hence, lesbian and gay couples were presumptive criminals,
22 See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 475-77.
23 For an overview of the referendum, see Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.
com/news/local/prop-8 (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
24 See infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
25 E.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (holding that the exclusion
of a gay couple from civil marriage is not discrimination because the nature of procreative
marriage requires one man and one woman), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)
(denying appeal for lack of a substantial federal question). Other early cases, making the
same kind of nature-of-marriage argument, are noted in ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 48-50, 52-59.
26 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-95 & nn.5-6.
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and the state was unlikely to provide its support to a relationship grounded in
criminal conduct. Worse still, public law in this country had, since the 1930s,
treated "homosexuals" as equivalent to "sex perverts" positively threatening to
the American family. Gay people were not only a despised minority in the
1970s, but they were a minority whose despicability helped define straight
people's identity as righteous paragons of modem family values.
27
Under these conditions, no official in America could get away with issuing
marriage licenses to lesbian and gay couples. One official who tried to do so
was Cela Rorex, the County Clerk of Boulder, Colorado. Because the state
marriage law was gender neutral, she issued marriage licenses to six lesbian
and gay couples in March 1975, and was deluged with dozens of telephone
calls objecting to her action, some of which included death threats. The state
attorney general nullified the marriages authorized under Rorex's licenses, and
state and federal judges refused to recognize those marriages.
28 Other efforts to
secure marriage licenses for committed lesbian and gay couples met a similar
fate in the 1970s and 1980s. 29
The political climate only became more hospitable to gay marriage claims
after the 1980s. More gay people than ever had come out of the closet, some in
response to the Supreme Court's splenetic decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
30
and others as a consequence of the AIDS epidemic. Many of the newly
uncloseted lesbians and gay men came out as couples, including couples
raising children within their relationships. As the traditional association of
"homosexuality" with predation and promiscuity began to give way to
associations with family and commitment, interest in and support for legal
marriage rights increased. A triggering event was Denmark's recognition of
lesbian and gay registered partnerships in 1989.31 If Danish couples could be
legally wed, the reasoning went, why not here in America?
Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel of Honolulu, Hawaii were one couple who
thought this way; they and two other couples brought suit to overturn that
state's bar to gay marriage in 1990.32 National LGBT litigation groups
discouraged the litigation, and the plaintiffs and their lawyers did very little
grass-roots organizing to drum up interest in their cause (or political cover in
27 This is the thesis of WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY
LAW IN AMERICA, 1861-2003, at ch. 7-8 (2008) (analyzing and explaining how the Supreme
Court could have reached the decision it reached in Bowers, 437 U.S. 186).
28 ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 55 (providing an
account of the Rorex story).
29 Id. at 49, 54-56.
30 478 U.S. at 192-96 (upholding a state "homosexual conduct" law, but with reasoning
grounded in an embarrassingly thin understanding of history and more than a few ignorant
comments about the people whose lives were being evaluated).
31 THE DANISH REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP ACT No. 372 (1989).
32 Brett P. Ryan, Love and Let Love: Same-Sex Marriage, Past, Present, and Future, and
the Constitutionality ofDOMA, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. 185, 200-05 (2000).
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case they won). To the surprise of the entire country, and perhaps the
plaintiffs as well, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin ruled that their
exclusion was sex discrimination subject to strict scrutiny under the state
constitution. 34 Although the court remanded the case for trial and therefore did
not issue a final order, the political response was swift and overwhelmingly
negative. The mere prospect of gay marriage in Hawaii set off a firestorm of
anti-gay legislation in other states and at the national level with the enactment
of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996.35 Even tolerant Hawaii reacted
negatively: the legislature proposed, and the voters overwhelmingly adopted an
amendment to the state constitution allowing the legislature to limit civil
marriage to one man and one woman. 36 On the eve of the millennium, after a
decade of sturm und drang on the issue of marriage equality, the nation was
right where it had been for two hundred years: no state recognized same-sex
marriages.
Map 1. State (Non)Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Unions - 1996 (DOMA)
Same-Sex Marriage Civil Unions, Donestic Partnerships, No Recognition for Lesbian or Gay
Recognized Reciprocal Beneficiaries Recognized Relationships, Unions, Marriages
n See id. at 205 n.137 (noting that national groups such as the Hawaii chapter of the
ACLU and Lamda Legal Defense and Education Fund refused to assist in the litigation).
34 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), clarified on reh'g, 852 P.2d 74, 74-75
(Haw. 1993). The sex discrimination argument, by the way, had not been made by the
plaintiffs' counsel and was suggested sua sponte by the court.
1 For documentation of the backlash against Baehr, see Part IIA.
36 David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai'i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and
Fate, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. 19, 26-28 (2000); see also id. at 95-102.
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B. Stage 2, Politics ofRecognition Breaks Through: 1996-2008
The national as well as state rejection of marriage equality after Baehr did
not stop the marriage equality movement. It did, however, teach putative
leaders a valuable lesson: do not attempt constitutional equality litigation
without grass-roots mobilization of your supporters and efforts to round up
political allies in the event that you prevail. In other words, the LGBT social
movement needed to have a flourishing and successful politics of recognition
in place before mounting any new campaign for marriage equality, and its
leaders needed to use the constitutional litigation as a focal point for grass-
roots mobilization.
This was the strategy of Vermont's coalition supporting same-sex marriage
that came together in the wake of Baehr v. Lewin. Beth Robinson, Susan
Murray, and other leaders carefully surveyed the Vermont LGBT community
and built up mainstream political support for marriage equality before
initiating their state constitutional lawsuit for recognition of same-sex
marriages.37 Vermont was the perfect state for such a lawsuit because the
LGBT community's politics of recognition had already enjoyed considerable
political success: the state legislature had not only repealed its consensual
sodomy law, but had also outlawed sexual orientation discrimination in the
workplace and public accommodations3 8 and had codified the state supreme
court's decision allowing two persons of the same sex to jointly adopt
children. 39 And, as compared to Hawaii and other western states, Vermont
made it significantly harder to amend its state constitution, by requiring
affirmative votes in the legislature in two successive sessions before a
proposed amendment could be presented to the voters.40
In December 1999 the Vermont Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. State that
the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from family law benefits and duties
violated the state constitution but left it to the Vermont Legislature to craft a
remedy.41 This creative remedy disappointed the plaintiffs and seemed to invite
backlash, but legislators and the governor responded with some sympathy to
lesbian and gay couples in early 2000. With the state divided between
supporters and opponents of marriage equality, and with the opponents likely
in the majority, the Vermont Legislature created a new institution for same-sex
" ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 45-48.
38 See An Act Relating to Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 1992 Vt.
Acts & Resolves No. 135 (amending numerous state laws, including the fair employment
practices and public accommodations statutes, to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation).
39 In 1993 the Supreme Court of Vermont held that state law did not require termination
of a natural mother's parental rights when her daughter was adopted by the mother's same-
sex partner. In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993). This decision was
codified in VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102.
40 VT. CONST. ch. 1, § 72.
41 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999).
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couples and invested these "civil unions" with all the legal rights and duties of
marriage. 42 Although there was a great deal of public opposition to this
compromise, it survived the 2000 election; efforts to repeal the civil union law
or to amend the state constitution failed.43 More than 8600 lesbian and gay
couples, many from out of state, were joined in legal civil unions between
2000 and the beginning of 2008.44
After Vermont, the next step, obviously, was to secure full marriage
recognition. The Netherlands' Parliament enacted marriage equality in that
nation in 2001, followed swiftly by Belgium's Parliament, but similar
legislation stood no chance of being enacted in this country. Buoyed by the
relative success of the Vermont litigation, in which they had participated, Gay
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) in Boston engaged in similar
grass-roots and political groundwork before filing its own marriage equality
lawsuit.45 In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, by a narrow four-to-three vote, agreed with GLAD's
advocate Mary Bonauto, and declared the state's marriage exclusion a
violation of the state constitution. 46
As in Vermont, the state supreme court's decision weathered the inevitable
attacks. Between 2004 and 2007, at the behest of Governor Mitt Romney, the
legislature considered several proposed constitutional amendments seeking to
override Goodridge; none of the proposals attracted enough legislative support
to be presented to the voters.47 In 2004 President George W. Bush and other
42 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 91. The law
announced a state interest "to encourage close and caring families, and to protect all family
members from the economic and social consequences of abandonment and divorce." Id. §
1(3). The legislature further found that "many gay and lesbian Vermonters have formed
lasting, committed, caring and faithful relationships with persons of their same sex," id. §
1(9), and that recognizing these relationships through a new institution satisfied Baker's
equal-treatment requirement while at the same time giving "due respect for tradition and
long-standing social institutions," id. § 1(10).
43 See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 79-83.
' Keck, supra note 13, at 170 tbl.4 (reporting that Vermont issued licenses for 8616 civil
unions between 2000 and the beginning of 2008). In 2009 Vermont replaced civil unions
with full marriage equality. See An Act Relating to Civil Marriage, 2009 Vt. Acts &
Resolves No. 3.
45 Bonauto, supra note 16 (offering a detailed account of the Goodridge marriage
equality litigation by the GLAD mastermind, Mary Bonauto).
46 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003) (interpreting
the Massachusetts constitution to require marriage equality for lesbian and gay couples).
Goodridge was followed and reaffirmed by Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802
N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
47 Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Gay Marriage Referendum Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2007, at A16 (providing a detailed account of the legislature's last vote rejecting a voter-
initiated proposal in which less than one-quarter of the legislators were willing to subject
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Republican leaders pressed Congress to send a proposed Federal Marriage
Amendment to the states for ratification,48 but this proposal, too, went
nowhere. Less than a majority of the Senate voted to cut off debate on the
proposal, well short of the sixty votes required to cut off debate and even
further from the two-thirds supermajority required by Article V.49
Massachusetts started issuing marriage licenses to lesbian and gay couples
on May 17, 2004.0 More than 10,000 lesbian and gay couples received
licenses from the state between 2004 and the beginning of 2008.51 As
momentous a breakthrough as that event was, the married couples had rights
primarily in Massachusetts, for most other states adopted nonrecognition laws
and the federal government was required by DOMA to treat these married
couples as unmarried.52 Indeed, in the wake of Goodridge, more states adopted
amendments to their state constitutions to entrench the norm that marriage is
limited to unions between one man and one woman. By 2006, forty-five states
had statutory or constitutional bars to marriage equality, with most having
both; almost all of these measures were a specific reaction to Baehr, Baker,
and Goodridge.53 Additionally, constitutional litigation for marriage equality
failed to achieve its objectives in New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and
Washington, a surprising parade of losses in states that were relatively gay-
friendly and filled with lesbian and gay couples rearing children.54 Likewise,
marriage equality to a constitutional referendum); see also KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 93-
97 (same).
48 See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 87-88, 99, 103.
49 For a detailed description and (sympathetic) analysis of the Federal Marriage
Amendment and the history of Federal Marriage Amendment deliberation, see Lynn D.
Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to Federalism in Family
Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 142-73, 195-98 (2004). The Federal Marriage Amendment
is cited as an important example of backlash politics by ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 365-
67.
50 Yvonne Abraham & Michael Paulson, Wedding Day: First Gays Marry; Many Seek
Licenses, Bos. GLOBE, May 18, 2004, at Al.
5' Keck, supra note 13, at 170 tbl.4.
52 For a snapshot of nonrecognition laws and constitutional amendments as of December
2011, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
app. 7, at 1139-41 (3d ed. 2011).
ss ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 362-63 ("[C]onservative groups began lobbying efforts . .
seeking laws defining marriage as a union between one man and one woman and refusing
to recognize out-of-state marriages between same-sex couples. These efforts proved
extraordinarily successful."). For a state-by-state survey of family law, including laws and
constitutional amendments limiting marriage to one man, one woman, see In Your State,
LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
54 Schacter, supra note 11, at 1172. For court decisions denying a state constitutional
right for lesbian and gay couples to marry, see Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 637 (Md.
2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211, 220-21 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006).
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state legislatures remained unwilling to adopt marriage equality laws, with the
notable exception of California, which had in 1999 created a new institution of
"domestic partnerships," and had in 2003 expanded domestic partnership to
include almost all the legal rights and duties of marriage.55
On the other hand, this period also witnessed a fairly steady increase in
support for marriage equality, especially among younger Americans. By 2008
there were 10,000 married lesbian and gay couples in Massachusetts, and
another 80,000 couples whose unions were recognized by other states as civil
unions, reciprocal beneficiaries, and domestic partnerships. 56 After Goodridge,
same-sex marriage was finally on the nation's map. Notwithstanding setbacks,
supporters of marriage equality were optimistic that other states would follow
Massachusetts' lead. And, soon enough, they did.
Map 2. State Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Unions - 2003
Sarne-Sex Marriage Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships, No Recognition for Lesbian or Gay
Recognized Reciprocal Beneficiaries Recognized Relationships. Unions. Marriages
C. Stage 3, From Backlash Toward Normal Politics: Post-2008
In Canada, our neighbor to the north, the marriage equality movement
advanced more rapidly through Stage 2 and into Stage 3, with the courts taking
the lead, as in the United States. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1999
that the government must provide lesbian and gay couples with the same legal
ss 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 421 (codified as amended at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (West
Supp. 2013)).
56 Keck, supra note 13, at 169, 170 tbl.4. Civil unions were recognized by Vermont and
New Jersey, reciprocal beneficiaries by Hawaii, and domestic partnerships by California. Id.
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rights and duties afforded straight married couples.
57 Not only did the decision
not produce a large backlash, but it also inspired new marriage equality
lawsuits. These lawsuits resulted in rulings by provincial courts of Ontario,
Quebec, and British Columbia that the Canadian Charter of Rights required
marriage equality. The national Parliament enacted legislation establishing
such equality in 2005.59 A similar judicial declaration, followed by legislative
codification, occurred in South Africa.60
LGBT movement lawyers in California were watching these developments
very closely. Unlike GLAD and the lawyers in New England, the California
LGBT movement lawyers had opted against a constitutional litigation strategy.
They avoided a constitutional litigation strategy because the California
Constitution was easy to amend by a majority vote of the electorate - hence
any decision by the California Supreme Court could be quickly overridden -
and because the U.S. Supreme Court was still considered unlikely to endorse a
federal constitutional claim.61 These lawyers secured a significant advance in
2003 when the California Legislature expanded the state domestic partnership
law to vest almost all the same rights and duties of marriage. The movement
lawyers' "avoid-litigation" strategy changed, however, after Goodridge was
decided in May 2003 and after San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom issued
hundreds of marriage licenses to lesbian and gay couples in February 2004.62
In the course of events following Newsom's game-changing fait accompli, San
Francisco and LGBT litigation groups filed state constitutional objections to
the state marriage exclusion.63
In June 2008 the California Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion in
the Marriage Cases.64 Not only did the court invalidate the state's
discrimination against lesbian and gay couples, but Chief Justice Ronald
5 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
58 See Hendricks v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.) (2004), 238 D.L.R. 4th 577 (Can. Que. C.A.);
EGALE Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Att'y Gen.) (2003), 13 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. B.C. C.A.);
Halpern v. Canada (Att'y Gen.) (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
59 Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (Can.). For an account of the constitutional
litigation and the legislative response, see Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and the
Charter: The Achievement of Formal Legal Equality (1985-2005) and Its Limits, 49
McGILL L.J. 1143 (2004).
6o Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Civil
Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Aft.).
61 Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1251-74 (providing a detailed account of the
California LGBT movement lawyers' legislation-focused strategy, up through 2004).
62 Id. at 1274-80 (recounting movement lawyers' reception of Newsom's decision); see
Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004) (invalidating Mayor Newsom's
marriage licenses).
63 Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1281-93 (detailing the origins of the
California marriage equality litigation and its path to victory at the California Supreme
Court).
I In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
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George's opinion for the divided court also ruled that sexual orientation is a
suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny. Chief Justice George also
applied the caselaw supporting a fundamental right to marry to support the
plaintiffs' claims under the state constitution. The year following the
Marriage Cases was a breakthrough period for marriage equality. Applying
heightened but not strict scrutiny, the highest courts in Connecticut and Iowa
also struck down marriage discrimination laws under their state constitutions, 66
while the Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine legislatures enacted marriage
equality laws. 67 The Council of the District of Columbia enacted a marriage
equality law in 2009, a measure that provoked criticism in Congress but was
left alone to take effect in 2010.68 In 2011 the New York Legislature enacted a
marriage equality statute, with bipartisan support for the measure.69
As with previous victories, there was political pushback. Most famously, in
November 2008 the California voters overrode the state supreme court by
adopting Proposition 8 to amend the California Constitution to limit marriage
to one man, one woman. 70 Eventually, Proposition 8 triggered the ultimate
marriage equality litigation: a lawsuit challenging the revised California
Constitution as inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. After trial, District Judge Vaughn Walker issued a sweeping
opinion striking down Proposition 8, and which, if followed to its logical
conclusion, would require the invalidation of almost any other form of
marriage discrimination denying lesbian and gay couples this fundamental
right to marry based upon a suspect classification.7 ' The Ninth Circuit affirmed
Judge Walker on very narrow grounds, 72 and the supporters of Proposition 8
65 Id. at 444-46.
66 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
67 Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage Cases, supra note 16, at 1786 & n.9.
68 Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, 57 D.C.
Reg. 1833 (Mar. 5, 2010) (codified at D.C. CODE § 46-401 (Supp. 2012)).
69 Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 95 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2013)).
70 For accounts of the Proposition 8 campaign, see Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage
Cases, supra note 16, at 1825-33; Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights:
Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357 (2009); Douglas
NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REv. 941, 1004-11 (2011).
1 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd sub nom. Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), reh'g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
2012), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (mem.).
72 Perry, 671 F.3d 1052, reh'g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth
Circuit framed the issue before it quite narrowly, refusing to address whether a state must
allow same-sex couples to marry. Id. at 1064 ("We need not and do not answer the broader
question in this case, however, because California had already extended to committed same-
sex couples [the right to marry], and Proposition 8's only effect was to take away that
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sought review from the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on December 7, 2012.73
In 2009 Maine voters followed the lead of California voters and turned back
marriage equality through a state initiative.74 But in 2012 Maine voters
revoked their earlier decision and supported a marriage equality initiative.75 In
the same election, the voters of Maryland and Washington agreed with their
legislatures and endorsed earlier marriage equality legislation, which took
effect in 2013 . The map below provides a portrait of how far marriage
equality, or something close to it, has come today.
Map 3. State Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Unions - 2013
Sanne-Sex Marriage Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships, No Recognition for Lesbian or Gay
Recognized Reciprocal Beneficiaries Recognized Relationships, Unions, Marriages
important and legally significant designation . . . . [This] allows us to address the
amendment's constitutionality on narrow grounds.").
7 Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786. In addition to granting certiorari on the question presented, the
Court also instructed the parties to brief the issue of whether the petitioners have Article III
standing. Id.
74 Michael A. Lindenberger, Gay-Marriage Activists Look Ahead After Maine Defeat,
TIME (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,
8 59 9,1934432,00.html.
75 Eric Eckholm, In Maine and Maryland, Victories at the Ballot Box for Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, at 14.
76 Id.; Same-Sex Marriage Rivals Concede in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, at
Al7.
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II. BACKLASH POLITICS
As previous scholarship affirms, every significant advance in marriage
equality for lesbian and gay couples came over intense and widespread
opposition; even the Vermont civil unions law faced tremendous opposition
both before and after its enactment. The three major litigation victories for
marriage equality - Hawaii in 1993, Massachusetts between 2003 and 2004,
and California in 2008 - not only generated local political reaction but also
responses nationwide. Based upon this evidence, Professor Rosenberg and
others argue that marriage equality through constitutional litigation is subject
to a powerful and typically overpowering politics of backlash.
There is much to be said for and against the Rosenberg thesis, but at the
very least supporters and critics need to have a definition of backlash politics,
and it would also be useful to have a theory of such politics. In this Part, I set
forth a definition and theory that distinguish backlash politics from normal
politics. I then apply this theory and definition to analyze the three periods laid
out in Part I and to suggest the Supreme Court's proper role in the next decade.
Consider an obvious but neglected point. For the last generation, the local
and national debates regarding marriage equality have involved three different
kinds of politics. The politics and the debates are related, to be sure, but they
create very different dynamics. The different kinds of politics can be
distinguished based upon the central motivating factors for participants, the
intensity they invest in the issue, and the types of arguments that are dominant.
The first kind of politics involves discussion of what is the best policy and
how best to implement that policy. Such normal politics focuses on the
consequences of different legal rules or regimes for different groups in society.
Would marriage equality meet the needs of lesbian and gay couples? Their
children? Should straight married couples be concerned that gay marriage will
weaken the institution of marriage or discourage their children from entering
into marital relationships? The ultimate question in normal politics is this:
would overall social utility be advanced by offering lesbian and gay couples
the same marriage rights long offered to straight couples? The consequentialist
arguments that are the focus of normal politics typically, albeit not always,
have these features: (1) participants seem motivated by tangible consequences
of various policy options and (2) reveal medium-to-low emotional intensity as
well as (3) relatively greater focus on facts and falsifiable predictions.
A second kind of political engagement is identity politics. The debate the
United States has been having over marriage equality is what I would call a
small "c" constitutional debate. 77 The constitutive issues in these debates
7 By small "c" constitutional, I mean to distinguish this kind of public debate from the
Large "C" Constitutional debates about the meaning of the U.S. Constitution. See WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1-24 (2010); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999) (advancing the notion of our "thin" Constitution, the nontechnical one that
engages the people of the United States).
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involve the expression of different personal or community identities, such as
traditional family values versus families we choose. Would recognition of
lesbian and gay marriages finally create a polity where lesbian and gay citizens
are given the equal and dignified treatment they deserve? Or would it instead
create a polity that gives equal value to relationships - gay marriages - that are
deeply inferior to the straight marriages long recognized and encouraged by the
state? Does marriage equality devalue existing straight marriages? Or does it
fulfill the inclusive potential of the evolving institution of civil marriage? The
arguments that are the focus of such a small "c" constitutional debate typically,
albeit not always, have these features: (1) participants seem motivated by
intangible or symbolic consequences of various policy options and (2) reveal
relatively higher emotional intensity as well as (3) relatively less focus on facts
and falsifiable predictions.
The stakes tend to be higher in the small "c" constitutional debates than they
are in the policy debates.78 This is in part because the constitutional issues are
more "personal" to voters and stakeholders than most policy issues tend to be.
Because they are more personal, they tend to generate more intense emotions
and to generate more spill-over effects beyond the particular issue in question,
forming linkages to a broader normative vision for what government ought to
be doing, or not doing, more generally.
79
The stakes are even higher in a third kind of political engagement, the
politics of disgust.80 Such a politics is triggered by primordial issues that are
deeply tied to people's feelings of disgust and contagion. For many Americans,
opposition to gay marriage is fueled by personal revulsion against
homosexuality and disgust for homosexual acts, and not merely by policy- or
identity-based reasons. The politics of disgust is the most intense kind of
politics, and the combustible feelings tied to it are sources of potential
violence. Because disgust is typically an emotion that informs people's
identities, it also motivates people's views about small "c" constitutional
78 To be sure, some policy debates have high stakes; anything that involves redistribution
of property, income, or assets tends to raise the stakes for Americans. But policy debates
involving redistribution entail even higher stakes if the redistribution is accompanied by a
constitutional redefinition of the polity's expressive identity.
79 There is a similarity here between these personal, identity-based issues and
"primordial" issues that political scientists warn can be toxic for the democratic process
because their "stakes" are too high. E.g., ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE
MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36-
37 (1991) ("[G]overnments must be able to govern, and this implies that they must be able
to prevent some demands from reaching the public sphere and certainly that they cannot
tolerate all important groups having veto power over public policy."); see also STEPHEN
HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 202-08,
222-27 (1995) (advocating "gag rules" to lower the stakes of primordial conversations in the
context of church-state entanglement).
so William N. Eskridge Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of
Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REv. 1011 (2005).
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issues. The politics of disgust is a form of identity politics that is particularly
intense, and potentially more violent.
Of course, any given issue can generate normal politics among one group of
citizens, identity politics among another group, and a politics of disgust among
yet another. Marriage equality has that feature, and some Americans toggle
back and forth among the three kinds of politics. Thus, individuals may make
relatively calm, fact-based arguments in favor of their preferred policy if they
are writing letters to newspaper editors, while making more personal and
emotional arguments if they are discussing the issue in church or at a gay
rights center. An important contrast is the role of names and symbols. For
policy discussions, a name usually makes little difference, while in
constitutional debates a name can make all the difference. Thus, from a policy
perspective, there may not be a documented difference between "marriage"
and "civil unions," that is, a new institution with identical legal rights and
duties as marriage, but from a constitutional perspective the difference in
nomenclature can be critically significant.8' Small "c" constitutional politics
are often symbolic or expressive politics, where the battle is over what
message the government should be sending the people. 82
Backlash politics, as I am using the term, starts with a widespread
perception that an issue is, for many and perhaps most voters, one of small "c"
constitutional significance and is not just a policy issue. The politics of
backlash is mobilized if the government takes a position that is an affront to
the issue-based identities of a significant minority, or even more so a majority,
of the population.83 The politics is even more intense if a significant number of
citizens find the government favoring minorities they deem to be disgusting
and impure. The extent and success of the countermobilization also depends in
part upon whether political entrepreneurs - political parties, important
officials, and private associations - seize upon the issue and devise smart legal
counterattacks. The extent and success of the countermobilization further
" See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 434-35 (Cal. 2008) (discussing the dignity
effects of providing lesbian and gay couples with "domestic partnerships" and straight
couples with "marriage").
82 Compare Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (arguing that an expressive theory of law justifies
judicial concern over "bizarrely" shaped electoral districts), with Matthew D. Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000)
(providing a thoughtful but critical examination of expressive theories of law).
83 If a small "c" constitutional issue intensely but evenly divides the polity, the
conventional wisdom among political scientists, with whom I agree, is that it is politically
disastrous for the government to declare a final winner, and final loser, on the divisive issue.
The leading citation is ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 93-99 (1956)
(arguing that the political system cannot produce a satisfactory result where two large
factions vehemently disagree over an issue that both rank highly in their value systems).
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depends upon whether the group advantaged by the government position is
able to mount a successful counter-backlash.
As Professor Rosenberg and other theorists maintain, recent successes
achieved by the marriage equality movement have generated a significant
backlash politics.84 It is important, however, to qualify the assertions of
backlash theorists in ways that they have neglected. To begin with, the
backlash politics following marriage equality advances are not as pervasive or
intense as these theorists have posited. Instead, there has been a highly
dynamic backlash politics, with the key variable being public attitudes toward
sexual and gender minorities. Are most citizens disgusted by the minority that
is now being treated equally, or less unequally? Do most citizens believe that
they have been disrespected by the state and that their identities are threatened
when the minority is treated the same (or almost the same)? Or do most
citizens feel sympathy for the minority, even as many feel that change should
come about slowly?
Thus, the early politics of marriage equality was dominated by disgust-based
backlash, as "homosexuals" were considered strange and disgusting characters
by most Americans. This perception fueled fear and intense dislike, leading to
a highly charged symbolic reaction such as the passage of DOMA and other
measures. As LGBT persons and families became better known to a larger
portion of the population, there has been more of a balance between the
politics of backlash and normal policy-oriented politics. In jurisdictions where
gay people and families are accepted on truly equal terms with straight people
and families, the politics of backlash appears only at the margins.
A second qualification that must be made to backlash theories is that they
have been too one-sided.85 That is, the backlash politics has had some tangibly
pro-gay consequences as well as anti-gay ones. For example, when backlash
politics produces public policy through statutes and judicial decisions, the
public justifications are often outrageously poor. Bootless reasoning and
scapegoating may get the job done in the short term, but they can be
counterproductive to opponents of equality in the longer term. Thus, political
entrepreneurs such as Speaker Newt Gingrich and President Bill Clinton
jumped on the DOMA bandwagon, accepting the policy argument that gay
marriage would undermine the institution and joining a symbolic politics
whereby gay people were scapegoated for the decline of marriage in this
country. The policy argument has been exposed as scandalously contrary to
both fact and reason,86 and the scapegoating argument has galvanized
84 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 361-82, 415-19.
85 This concern is rapidly abating, as some voices for backlash theory have recently taken
back many of their concerns. See infra note 136.
86 E.g., ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 16, at 169-202 (analyzing carefully and
proving as false the argument that marriage equality would undermine marriage); Laura
Langbein & Mark A. Yost Jr., Same-Sex Marriage and Negative Externalities, 90 Soc. SCI.
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supporters of marriage equality and discredited opponents among young
people, who are dismayed by canards such as this.
Third, and most tentatively, there is reason to doubt that equality advances
through courts always generate a significantly more virulent form of backlash
politics. The theory of backlash politics advanced in this Article suggests that
there will be negative reactions to any advance in minority rights, regardless of
which institution makes the equality-advancing move. Thus, the person who is
personally disgusted by "homosexuals" or whose religious identity is tied to
traditional marriage as the only state-sanctioned union, will be just as outraged
by marriage equality delivered by a legislature as the same policy announced
by a court. While opponents of marriage equality give some emphasis to
undemocratic decisionmaking when judges impose marriage equality, there is
still no hard evidence that the level of affront and outrage is always higher
simply because a court rather than a legislature recognizes same-sex marriages.
This is not to say that institutional forum does not make a difference. It
does, but not primarily for the reasons advanced by backlash theorists. The
main difference institutional forum makes involves timing of the public debate.
Because there are so many vetogates blocking controversial measures,
legislatures tend to advance marriage equality in smaller steps and only after
most voters have come to support or acquiesce in it; courts, by contrast, find it
harder to avoid controversial issues and are more prone to jump the gun when
such issues are presented. That risk, however, has been greatly ameliorated by
the experience the nation has had with marriage equality. As early as the
Vermont and Massachusetts marriage litigations, movement lawyers and
judges have understood that marriage equality cannot arrive too far ahead of
public opinion supporting or acquiescing in marriage equality. Also, in both
states, legislatures helped prepare the way for marriage equality by enacting
anti-discrimination laws that made it safer for LGBT persons to be out of the
closet and openly engaged in a same-sex union, partnership, or marriage.
Ironically, for properly "managed" marriage equality campaigns, courts have
typically been more in tune with public opinion than legislatures have been (a
point suggested to me by Professor David Fontana).
A. The Politics ofDisgust: Aggressive Backlash Triumphant, 1993-1996
The justices on the Hawaii Supreme Court who decided that the state's
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage violated the state
constitution were simply applying strict legal logic as well as the constitutional
policy of the state's equal rights amendment, which required strict judicial
scrutiny of any kind of state-imposed gender roles. But the prospect of
recognizing lesbian and gay partnerships as "marriages" appalled most
Americans, and was swiftly rebuffed even in tolerant Hawaii. The politics in
Hawaii was an amalgam of normal, identity, and disgust politics. Thus, Baehr
Q. 292 (2009) (using empirical analysis to demonstrate that marriage equality has no
negative effects on marriage as an institution).
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motivated the Hawaii Legislature to pass, and the voters to ratify, a
constitutional amendment allowing the legislature to limit marriage to one
man, one woman. But it also motivated the legislature to create, for the first
time in American history, an institution for recognition of lesbian and gay
families, namely, the reciprocal beneficiaries law adopted as part of the 1997
compromise that placed the marriage amendment on the ballot for the voters.87
The backlash outside of Hawaii was an impressive example of the politics of
disgust, as well as an intense identity politics.88 If Hawaii had ever started
issuing marriage licenses, choice of law rules allowed other states not to
recognize those marriages in their jurisdictions.8 9 But a large number of
Americans were emotionally upset that disgusting "homosexuals" would be
given marriage rights or that "traditional marriage" would be sacrificed. Most
of these people were also alarmed at contagion: the possibility that impure
"homosexual" couples would get married in Hawaii and then travel to their
jurisdiction and establish a beachhead for the dreaded "homosexual agenda."
The power of this politics of disgust and identity was revealed by the actions of
many states to head off marriage recognition even without final action by
Hawaii or any other state. Thus, between 1993 and 2004, thirty-seven states
passed statutes - or, in three cases, constitutional amendments - defining
marriage as limited to one man and one woman, banned recognition of any
same-sex marriage performed in another state, or, typically, did both.90 Such
laws were classically expressive, reaffirming the electorate's commitment to
traditional marriage and family values, and were adopted with virtually no
public debate or organized opposition.
The sweeping nature of state repudiation of Baehr, even before it could have
conceivably affected family law in other states, reflected not only the
exceedingly lopsided opposition to gay marriage, 91 but also the intense and
1 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383, discussed in ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note
16, at 23-25.
88 ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 364-65.
89 ANDREw KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW
94-126 (2002).
90 Nonrecognition statutes were passed in 1995 by North Carolina and Utah; in 1996 by
Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee; in 1997 by Arkansas, Indiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, and Virginia; in 1998 by
Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, and Washington; and in 2000 by California, Colorado, Texas,
and West Virginia. See In Your State, supra note 53; see also ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY
PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 28 n.*. Nonrecognition constitutional amendments were
adopted in Alaska in 1998, in Nevada in 2000, and in Nebraska in 2002. See Joseph F.
Morrissey, Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 609, 668-69 (2011)
(listing all state same-sex-marriage-related statutes and constitutional amendments).
1 One pre-Baehr poll from 1988 pegged support for same-sex marriage at twelve percent
of Americans, with seventy-three percent opposed, most of them strongly so. See Schacter,
supra note 11, at 1193.
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deeply held views that many people harbored about this issue, based upon
feelings of disgust and upon one's identity as a religious person committed to
traditional marriage. Importantly, the swift action by so many states reflected
political entrepreneurship by the Republican Party, which deployed the issue as
a wedge between the Democratic Party and its traditional Roman Catholic and
Southern Baptist constituents. 92 The importance of GOP sponsorship of the
anti-gay-marriage stance was revealed most dramatically at the federal level, in
the presidential election of 1996.
Republicans had won significant majorities in both chambers of Congress in
1994, and the intense popular disagreement with Baehr inspired the GOP
congressional leadership to sponsor a federal response that would attract anti-
gay voters to its candidates and would put President Clinton and his party in a
tough spot.93 Unfortunately for both gay people and Republicans, President
Clinton did not hesitate to turn against the LGBT voters who had provided
most of his margin of victory in 1992.94 With his endorsement, most of the
Democrats in Congress voted with virtually all of the Republicans to pass the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 95 DOMA authorizes state laws refusing to
recognize out-of-state gay marriages 96 and provides that every federal statute
and regulation involving marriage or spousehood shall never be construed to
include gay marriages. 97
DOMA was a symbolic, backlash statute and had little connection to federal
policy: (1) there were no gay marriages to head off when the law was adopted,
nor was there a serious prospect of any such law; (2) the authorization for state
nonrecognition laws was completely unnecessary, as normal choice of law
precepts guaranteed that states opposed to gay marriage would not have to
recognize such marriages entered into in sister states; and (3) the exclusion of
same-sex marriages from more than 1100 federal statutory and regulatory
provisions was tremendously overbroad and reflected virtually no serious
statute-by-statute policy analysis. For example, dozens of the regulations
affected by DOMA are those heading off conflicts of interest by federal
officials: if one's spouse has an interest in a controversy, the officeholder is
92 See id. at 1205-07 (emphasizing the importance of GOP entrepreneurship in creating
the giant backlash against marriage equality after Baehr).
93 See Editorial, Unfinished Business: The Defense of Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 2,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/opinion/sunday/03sun1 .html?_r-0.
94 President Clinton received forty-three percent of the vote, with a margin of victory
against Former President H.W. Bush of approximately six percent. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMIsSIoN, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 92: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S.
SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 9 (1993), available at http://www.fec.go
v/pubrec/fel 992/federalelections92.pdf.
9 Pub. L. No. 10-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). See generally KOPPELMAN, supra note 89 (describing, analyzing,
and critiquing DOMA).
96 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
" 1 U.S.C. § 7.
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required to recuse herself from taking part in a decision. By excluding lesbian
and gay spouses from these recusal requirements, DOMA unwittingly
undermines good government.98 The legislative debates surrounding DOMA
were dominated by the politics of disgust, where legislators expressed hatred
or disapproval of disgusting "homosexuals," but also included a great deal of
discussion grounded in identity politics and even normal politics.
Professor Jane Schacter joins Professor Rosenberg in maintaining that the
power of the anti-marriage backlash following Baehr reflected popular outrage
against "judicial activism,"99 but the evidence suggests that concern with
judicial activism was, at best, a secondary motivation for DOMA, the most
sweeping anti-gay measure in American history. The congressional response
was focused entirely on the possibility that Hawaii, or some other state, might
soon recognize same-sex marriages, and not on the precise mechanism for such
recognition. There is every reason to believe that a marriage recognition law
passed by the Hawaii Legislature would have had similar consequences in
Washington D.C., as the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr.o10 In
other words, political rhetoric notwithstanding, backlash against a court
decision people do not like is not necessarily different than backlash against a
political decision people do not like. I believe this is especially true for
decisions that trigger a disgust-centered backlash.
This point can, cautiously, be generalized, based upon a highly informative
experimental analysis by Professors David Fontana and Donald Braman.101
They found that the institutional decisionmaker - court versus legislature - had
some, but not determinative, effect on people's reactions to a governmental
decision on a controversial issue they cared about. Specifically, the authors
found that a court decision supporting, for example, marriage equality would
not change people's minds about how they felt on this issue but would
mobilize both supporters and opponents of marriage equality, with the latter
mobilized somewhat more than the former. 102 I would qualify the Fontana and
Braman thesis in this way: how stakes-raising and polarizing the judicial
decision would be depends in large part on how intensely and how evenly
divided the body politic was before the decision. When most people are
invested in the symbolism of the status quo, there will be much more of a
backlash, as there was in Hawaii in 1993, than when people feel less intensely
and are more evenly divided, as they were in California in 2008.
98 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 13 n.8 (1st
Cir. 2012).
9 Schacter, supra note 11, at 1208-12.
"00 Indeed, a statute actually adopted by the legislature would have set off more fire
alarms among traditionalists and partisan entrepreneurs, as it would have represented a final
decision by state officials rather than the preliminary decision handed down in Baehr.
"o David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence
from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 731 (2012).
102 Id. at 766-67.
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B. Identity Politics: Backlash Subsides, 2000-2004
The Fontana and Braman thesis, as revised above, provides an excellent way
to understand the marriage debate in Vermont from 1999 to 2000. Recall that
the Vermont Supreme Court insisted upon equal legal treatment but also held
back from issuing a final ruling on the issue of marriage equality. The Vermont
Legislature took up the issue and made the final decision in favor of civil
unions, and the backlash in that state was mainly against the legislature and not
against the court. But the anti-marriage equality backlash was not nearly as
powerful as had been the case in Hawaii after Baehr. There are probably
several reasons for this: (1) Baehr had already produced the primary backlash
nationwide; (2) Vermonters in 2000 were more gay-accepting and less gay-
disgusted than the national population and perhaps even the Hawaiian voters
had been in 1993-1996;103 and, critically (3) the compromise did not go so far
as marriage equality. The analysis in this Article provides a framework for
understanding why legalizing civil unions was a brilliant strategic move: it
created a wedge between the politics of disgust and identity politics.
Vermonters motivated primarily by disgust were alarmed by any advance for
despised "homosexuals," but Vermonters motivated by identity politics were
not nearly as alarmed by civil unions as they would have been by marriage
equality. Because gay-skeptical Vermonters fell more in the latter category, the
debate was less acrimonious and did not divide the state for long.
Vermont was a turning point in the politics of backlash against the marriage
equality movement, and one reason was institutional: by sending the issue to a
legislative process that the court knew would engage in a serious debate, 104 the
Vermont Supreme Court's action engaged the people of Vermont in a far-
reaching, small "c" constitutional debate about what kind of society and values
the people wanted. By requiring a public debate in a small state where people
would be able to engage the legislature directly, the supreme court put pressure
on opponents to deemphasize the politics of disgust that had dominated
congressional debate in 1996 and to emphasize policy- and identity-based
arguments. Indeed, the legislative debates regarding the civil unions law were
among the most normatively engaged debates I have read, with opponents as
well as supporters of the new institution making heartfelt, and usually quite
respectful, constitutional claims about the society they wanted for their beloved
state.105 Consistent with my model of backlash politics, the opponents of the
civil unions statute did not give up. Supported by a Republican Party
capitalizing on a potential wedge issue in a state that was trending toward the
103 David Goodman, A More Civil Union, MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2000/07/more-civil-union (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
104 Chief Justice Amestoy, the author of the Vermont Supreme Court's opinion in Baker
v. State, was the state attorney general before being named to the court and so was
intimately familiar with the legislature.
"os ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 57-80 (analyzing in detail the
legislative debates leading up to the Vermont civil unions law).
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Democrats, the "Take Back Vermont" movement sought removal of all
officials responsible for the controversial law.
Initially, Take Back Vermont had a fair degree of success, as five
Republicans who supported the law were defeated in the GOP primary, and the
party nominated Take Back Vermont supporter Ruth Dwyer for governor. It
is remarkable, however, that the backlash did not have as much bite in
November 2000. The Republicans did take over the Vermont House of
Representatives but not the Senate, which remained strongly pro-civil union.
Governor Howard Dean, a strong civil unions supporter, was reelected, with
Dwyer receiving fewer votes in 2000 than she had received when she ran
against Dean in 1998.107 The biggest electoral winner, ironically, was Senator
James Jeffords, a pro-civil unions Republican who won an overwhelming
reelection and, in May 2001, left the Republican Party, in part because of its
intolerant stances on social issues.108
In retrospect, it appears that the local backlash against the civil unions law
hit its high point in the middle of 2000 and receded after that, substantially
replaced by normal politics in a remarkably short period of time. When
Governor Dean retired in 2002 and was replaced by a Republican, the new
governor, James Douglas, announced that the civil unions law should remain in
place. In 2009 the Vermont Legislature passed a marriage equality law over
Governor Douglas's veto. 109 Given the relatively placid reaction to the new
law, it is likely that most Vermonters either shared the constitutional vision of
marriage equality or, if opposed, did not view lesbian and gay marriages as
deeply threatening to their own identities; disgust against gay people had
virtually disappeared from public discourse. The reason for the change in
public opinion is that the thousands of civil unions had no terrible effects on
the state, and more traditionalist Vermonters softened their views when they
met, socialized, and worked with openly lesbian or gay colleagues and their
spouses.
Like Vermont in 2000, Massachusetts in 2003 was a gay-tolerant state when
the state supreme court interpreted the state constitution to require marriage
equality. Yet there was a backlash politics at least as strong as that felt by
Vermont supporters. As one of the participating justices, Roderick Ireland -
106 See Elizabeth Mehren, Voters Oust 5 Who Backed Vt. Civil Union Law, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 14, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/14/news/mni-
2 094 2 .
10' ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 81-82. Dean earned 52% of the
vote, Dwyer 38%, and 10% went to a third-party progressive candidate who supported
marriage equality, not just civil unions. Id. at 81.
1os In a further irony, Jeffords' departure from the GOP handed the U.S. Senate over to
the Democrats, who ran the Senate between May 2001 and January 2003. See Dan Morgan,
Sen. Jeffords Says He Plans to Step Down, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2005), http://www.washin
gtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A
44 81-2005Apr20.html.
"I An Act Relating to Civil Marriage, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 3; see also
Katharine Q. Seelve, Vermont Lawmakers Consider Same-Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0
3/18/us/I 8vermont.html.
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now the Chief Justice - recalls, traditionalists took Goodridge as a personal
affront to themselves, their religious faith, and the society they thought they
lived in.11o A large minority, perhaps even a majority, of Massachusetts
citizens felt intensely and personally that the decision was wrong for them and
for the state. Moreover, political entrepreneurs seized upon the issue for
strategic purposes. Specifically, Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney
positioned himself as the leader of the anti-marriage equality countermovement
and supported various constitutional amendments to override the court. With
an eye on his planned presidential bid in 2008, gay marriage was precisely the
Etch A Sketch pivot that Governor Romney needed to reposition himself as a
"severe conservative" to secure the GOP nomination for the nation's highest
office.' Pursuing the same strategy, the governor also revived a 1913 statute
barring Massachusetts from issuing marriage licenses to out-of-state couples
whose home states would not recognize their unions. 112
Under my theory, Governor Romney nonetheless played an important role
in lowering the stakes of politics surrounding the gay marriage issue. It is
critically important that he led the opposition to marriage equality but - as far
as I can tell - avoided the rhetoric of disgust; his opposition rested upon a
moderate version of identity politics and normal politics. Also important was
the fact that opponents of marriage equality felt they had a high-ranking
champion who pressed their interests and was able to ameliorate the impact of
the decision through his invocation of the 1913 law.
As was the case after Baehr, the reaction to Goodridge was more intense in
other states and at the national level, where the politics of disgust still retained
a constituency and gay people were less acceptable. The Republican Party at
both the national and state level sought to consolidate its strong electoral
position with appeals to traditionalist opponents of marriage equality outside
Massachusetts. Thus, the Federal Marriage Amendment, which had languished
on the back benches of the House of Representatives in 2002 and 2003,
10 Roderick L. Ireland, In Goodridge's Wake: Reflections on the Political, Public, and
Personal Repercussions of the Massachusetts Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1417, 1417 (2010) (describing the "extreme public backlash that followed the same-sex
marriage cases .. . through the personal lens of his own experience dealing with the extreme
reaction to Goodridge").
". Etch A Sketch is a toy that allows the user to create an image with magnetic filings on
a screen; by shaking the toy, the user can eliminate the old image and then create a new one.
In 2012, one of the governor's campaign advisers suggested, in a rare moment of political
candor, that once Governor Romney secured the GOP presidential nomination by presenting
himself as a "severe conservative," he could start over as a moderate for the general
election, just like the Etch A Sketch toy. Michael D. Shear, For Romney's Trusted Adviser,
'Etch A Sketch' Comment is a Rare Misstep, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.nytim
es.com/201 2/0 3/2 2/us/politics/etch-a-sketch-remark-a-rare-misstep-for-romey-adviser.html
?_r-0.
112 See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 651-52 (Mass. 2006)
(upholding the 1913 law but interpreting it narrowly).
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suddenly found "soaring" support after Goodridge.1 President George W.
Bush endorsed it in his State of the Union Address in January 2004, and GOP
Representatives and Senators flocked to co-sponsor the measure.1 14 Moreover,
local Republicans across the nation engineered almost a dozen anti-marriage
constitutional initiatives on state ballots in 2004 as a direct response to
Goodridge and Baker, for those decisions were tangible evidence that state
supreme courts could impose gay marriage or civil unions upon a political
system that would not have acted otherwise. The voters endorsed the initiatives
in November 2004, almost all of them by huge margins.'15
While backlash politics was mighty powerful in 2004, it was not as powerful
as the main theorists have suggested and much less powerful than the backlash
after Baehr. The reason for the less severe backlash was a marked decline in
the politics of disgust. As increasing numbers of Americans were becoming
familiar with committed lesbian and gay couples, even the most vocal
opponents of gay marriage, Governor Romney and President Bush, distanced
their opposition from the politics of disgust and identity and tried to shroud
their advocacy as purely a matter of normal politics. Additionally, identity
politics opposing gay marriage lost some of its edge once Massachusetts
started handing out marriage licenses to lesbian and gay couples in May 2004,
with no reported ill effects and with every heterosexual marriage intact. Ann
and Mitt Romney had likely never been happier and surely suffered no
personal problems because lesbian and gay couples were raising children in
marital relationships such as theirs.
Accordingly, backlash alarmists, who had plenty of material for their case in
the 1990s, have had to stretch the evidence to find dramatic examples of
political backlash after May 2004. For example, Professor Rosenberg
ominously claims that presidential candidate John Kerry "might well" have
lost Ohio, and with it the presidency, in his 2004 challenge to President George
W. Bush because an anti-gay-marriage initiative on the Ohio ballot brought out
so many unexpected Bush voters. 116 Even by its own terms, to say that a result
"might well" have hinged on a turnout variable is no argument that there was a
significant backlash. There were, literally, hundreds of reasons Kerry "might
well" have lost Ohio, including the fact that Kerry himself was from
Massachusetts, whose candidates have throughout American history
demonstrated a dismal record attracting votes in Ohio.117 More seriously,
113 Wardle, supra note 49, at 143 (stating that "support for the Federal Marriage
Amendment soared" after Goodridge and the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence).
114 Id.
115 James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES (NOV.
4, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/04/politics/campaign/04gay.htm-ll.
"6 ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 382; see also KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 111 (arguing
that "the outcome of the [2004] election quite possibly turned on gay marriage").
"7 Ohio has a virtually unbroken tradition of voting against Massachusetts-based
candidates for President, starting with former Secretary of State and then-President John
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political scientists think that Kerry's campaign foundered, not on the gay
marriage issue, but on the highly effective, and grossly inaccurate, "Swiftboat
Ads" created by wealthy GOP donors.118 Rosenberg seems to think that the
existence of an anti-marriage initiative on the Ohio ballot in 2004 brought out
enough new voters to sink Kerry in that state, but this argument rests upon
unsupported speculation that has been specifically refuted by a rigorous
analysis of the 2004 election data by MIT political scientists Stephen
Ansolabehere and Charles Stewart 111.119
Moreover, the fact remains that Vermont after 2000 and Massachusetts after
2004 turned back the politics of backlash; civil unions survived in Vermont,
which later transformed them into marriages in 2009, and marriage equality
survived in Massachusetts. When the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that
marriage equality was constitutionally required in 2008,120 the politics of
backlash was vastly more muted than it had been a few years before in
neighboring Massachusetts, and the Connecticut Legislature codified the
court's ruling by statute the following year. 121
To be sure, gay marriage continued to be highly controversial in the four
years between 2004 and 2008, with supporters still losing more court cases
than they won. In 2006 and 2007, the highest courts in Maryland, New York,
New Jersey, and Washington - all gay-friendly jurisdictions - rejected
marriage equality claims under their state constitutions, 122 while in 2008 and
2009 the highest courts in California, Connecticut, and Iowa accepted such
Quincy Adams, who lost Ohio to Senator Henry Clay in 1924 and to former Senator
Andrew Jackson in 1928, later continuing with Senator John Kennedy losing Ohio to Vice
President Richard Nixon in 1960, with Governor Michael Dukakis losing Ohio to Vice
President George H.W. Bush in 1988, with Senator John Kerry losing Ohio to President
George W. Bush in 2004, and recently triggering a concession speech from former
Governor Mitt Romney, who lost Ohio to President Barack Obama in 2012. The only time
in its history that Ohio voted for a Massachusetts-based presidential candidate was in 1924,
when President and former Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge won the state in his
national landslide victory. See UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, http://usel
ectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
118 Kate Zemike, Kerry Pressing Swift Boat Case Long After Loss, N.Y. TIMES (May 28,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/washington/28kerry.htmlpagewanted=all&_r-
0.
"I Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III, Truth in Numbers: Moral Values and
the Gay-Marriage Backlash Did Not Help Bush, BOSTON REV., Feb.-Mar. 2005, at 40, 40.
120 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008).
121 An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection Under the Constitution of
the State for Same Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Acts No. 09-13 (Reg. Sess.).
122 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 608 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196,
211 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006); Anderson v. King's
Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
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claims.123 The California Supreme Court's narrow four-to-three decision in the
Marriage Cases was particularly significant, for the court overruled both
legislative statutes as well as a popular initiative in 2000 entrenching marriage
as limited to different-sex couples. Predictably, there was a political response,
and the electorate overrode the court in November 2008 when they narrowly
approved Pro osition 8 by a 52%-to-48% vote, amending the California
Constitution.
There are several important lessons to be learned from the Proposition 8
campaign. First, the campaign mobilized backlash politics, but at a much lower
level of intensity than Vermont and Massachusetts had seen in 2000 and 2004,
and than California itself had seen in previous anti-gay initiatives.1
2 5 Indeed, in
their public campaign, supporters of Proposition 8 departed from the gay-
bashing, disgust-based politics of earlier initiatives and depicted gay people as
nice neighbors and friends who had the option of entering into domestic
partnerships, which the proponents implicitly supported.1
26 Both supporters
and opponents were engaged by identity-based small "c" constitutional energy,
but the stakes were lower than before. The Proposition 8 campaign was
generally overshadowed by the presidential race between Senator Barack
Obama and Senator John McCain, both of whom said as little as possible about
gay marriage and had voted against the Federal Marriage Amendment.
Ironically, the Proposition 8 campaign reflected the dynamics of backlash
politics in the new millennium. Even opponents of gay marriage have
renounced public appeals to the politics of disgust; identity politics is now the
focus of opposition, with its intensity declining every year; and the normal-
politics arguments against marriage equality are becoming vanishingly thin, as
123 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412;
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
124 Randall C. Archibold & Abby Goodnough, California Voters Ban Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/0
6ballot.html.
125 Specifically, previous anti-gay initiatives in California had directly invoked lurid
stereotypes of predatory, child-molesting "homosexuals" (the 1978 anti-gays-in-schools
initiative) and of gay people as selfish and anti-family (the 2000 anti-marriage initiative),
which were abandoned for a gentler campaign in 2008 that emphasized gay people as
friends and neighbors who could manage quite well with domestic partnerships. See
Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage Cases, supra note 16, at 1825-34 (documenting the
contrasts between the various anti-gay referenda).
126 See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 52, at 1123-38 (reprinting the ballot materials
and a funny cartoon that were the centerpiece of the Yes-on-8 campaign in California).
There were unofficial efforts, such as robo-calls, on the part of some supporters of
Proposition 8 to invoke the old politics of disgust. Because most of those efforts were below
the media radar, it is hard to tell exactly how significant they were and what effect they had
on people's votes.
127 See Scott Conroy, Palin Breaks with McCain on Gay Marriage Ban, CBSNEWS.COM
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proponents stretch the bounds of plausibility with every new line of argument
(after previous arguments have failed to gain traction).
Another lesson from the Proposition 8 campaign is that our federalist system
offers identity-based groups multiple forums in which to press their small "c"
constitutional agenda. The structure and rules of the forums for public debate
make a big difference in the short term. Thus, in California, marriage equality
advocates had secured legislative approval in both 2005 and 2007, but
legislation was blocked when GOP Governor Schwarzenegger successfully
vetoed both bills. Then, marriage equality supporters trumped the Governator
with a constitutional decision from the state supreme court. That decision was,in turn, trumped by Proposition 8, through which the voters amended the state
constitution. In my view, the best response by supporters of marriage equality
would have been to advance a new initiative in 2012 to revoke Proposition 8.
Instead, however, a group of straight supporters brought a new lawsuit, Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, to overturn Proposition 8 as inconsistent with the U.S.
Constitution. The plaintiffs have, thus far, prevailed on narrow grounds in the
Ninth Circuit,128 and the U.S. Supreme Court will review the case in the 2012
Term. The availability of both small "c" as well as large "C" Constitutional
claims means that the stakes will remain potentially quite high.
C. Normal Politics: Beyond Backlash, 2009-2013
Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York, elected in 2010, and President
Barack Obama, elected in 2008 and reelected in 2012, are significant political
entrepreneurs who have helped move marriage equality away from backlash
politics and toward normal politics. Legislatures are notoriously slow to meet
new social needs, and no legislature in the country has been as gridlocked for
as long as the New York Legislature. 129 Yet in 2011 Governor Cuomo, assisted
by a brief period in which his party controlled both chambers, persuaded
decisive bipartisan majorities to enact marriage equality legislation. 130
Predictably, backlash politics was mobilized, but with Republicans themselves
divided on the issue, it had little resonance at either the state or national level.
Also highly significant was President Obama's volte-face in 2012.
Previously a supporter of civil unions but not full marriage rights for same-sex
couples, the President, in an interview on May 9, 2012, announced that he
supported marriage equality.' Polls taken after his announcement suggested
that this stance would neither garner nor lose the President large numbers of
128 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (mem.).
129 Mark Z. Barabak & Richard Simon, N.Y Takes Legislative Gridlock to a New Level,
L.A. TIMEs, July 6, 2009, at A14.
" For a thoughtful account of the New York Legislature's debate in 2011, see FLEMING
& MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 199-206.
131 Civil Rights, WHITE HouSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil-rights (last
visited Jan. 18, 2013).
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votes in the November 2012 election against probable Republican nominee
Mitt Romney.132 Reflecting his party's platform, Governor Romney, who had
led the fight against marriage equality and even civil unions in Massachusetts,
continued to oppose marriage equality. But that issue was virtually absent from
Romney's campaign speeches and commercials, and was never discussed in
the four presidential and vice-presidential debates.'
33 President Obama's
decisive reelection was far from a referendum on gay rights, but it is worth
noting that his margin of victory was less than the vote margin by which he is
estimated to have bested Governor Romney among LGBT voters.1
34 Political
parties notice results like these, and quietly respond to them.
As in 2004 and 2008, marriage equality was on the ballot in several states in
2012. In Minnesota, the voters considered an amendment to the state
constitution to bar same-sex marriages, but in Maine, Maryland, and
Washington initiatives offered the voters an opportunity to endorse, rather than
veto, marriage equality. Remarkably, voters in Minnesota rejected the anti-
marriage equality position, and voters in Maine, Maryland, and Washington
endorsed marriage equality.13 5 With these victories, not only did three more
states join the growing number of jurisdictions supporting marriage equality,
but they did so after civil electoral campaigns that reflected lower stakes and,
by implication, much less backlash than the country had seen in 2004.
In short, 2012 was the watershed year for the backlash politics against
marriage equality. In that year, the issue moved decisively toward normal
politics rather than backlash politics for the nation as a whole. Perhaps
reflecting events that are now too clear to deny, some prominent adherents to
the Rosenberg backlash hypothesis published pieces in 2012 expressing
belated optimism that marriage equality is an idea whose time is more swift in
coming than backlash theorists had confidently assumed just a few years
ago.136 I have long argued that marriage equality is inevitable, as the arguments
132 Trudy Ring, Poll: Majority of Voters Unaffected by Obama Marriage Stance,
ADVOCATE.COM (May 11, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/election/2
0 12/
0511/obama-marriage-equality-statement-will-not-change-many-votes.
133 Alan Greenblatt, During Debates, Silence on Some Issues Was Deafening, NPR (Oct.
23, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/201
2/10/23/163488809/during-d
ebates-silence-on-some-issues-was-deafening.
134 Micah Cohen, Gays Support Buoyed Obama, as the Straight Vote Split, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2012, at A21 (reporting an empirical survey showing that Obama won seventy-six
percent of the gay vote, while Romney carried only twenty-two percent).
13 Alana Semuels, Voters in Maine, Md. OK Gay Marriage: Long Losing Streak for
Measure Broken, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 7, 2012, at C15.
136 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Lincolnian View of Same-Sex Marriage, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 12, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-12/lincoln-the-justice
s-and-same-sex-marriage.html (expressing optimism that marriage equality is fast-
approaching, notwithstanding the domination of backlash fears in the author's earlier
scholarship). Notably, Professors Fleming and McClain urged Sunstein to adopt this more
optimistic approach, observing that others such as Klarman had retreated from his worries
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against it do not bear serious examination. 37 This point has had special
resonance with younger Americans who overwhelmingly support marriage
equality, many of them quite zealously.
That backlash politics is in decline does not mean that it has been
obliterated, however. Sixty percent of North Carolina voters endorsed an anti-
marriage constitutional amendment in May 2012,138 and there is every reason
to believe that large numbers of Americans in the South, the border states,
much of the Midwest and plains states, and the Rocky Mountian states
continue to view this issue as small "c".constitutional and fundamental to their
identities. Even in jurisdictions where gay marriage is largely accepted, the
politics of disgust remains a concern. Specifically, anti-gay "hate groups" have
proliferated both nationwide and, in marriage equality jurisdictions in the last
decade.139 While most of the organizations considered by progressives to be
"hate groups"l40 do not advocate violence against LGBT persons, there has
been a strong surge in violence targeted against sexual and gender minorities
since 2003 and 2004, especially in jurisdictions recognizing gay marriage. 14 1
Nor does the foregoing analysis mean that backlash politics cannot return to
the national arena, perhaps with a vengeance. If the respondents in
Hollingsworth v. Perry can persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to affirm the
about anti-gay backlash. FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 228-32. Compare
KLARMAN, supra note 15 (voicing greater optimism about marriage equality litigation in
2012 than previously), with Klarman, supra note 11 (expressing a pessimistic account of
marriage equality litigation in 2005).
137 See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 123-83
(arguing in 1996 that the Equal Protection Clause ultimately requires state recognition of
same-sex marriages).
138 Elizabeth Hartfield, Amendment One North Carolina: Anti-Gay Marriage Measure
Passes, ABC NEWS BLOGS (May 8, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://abcnews.go.comiblogs/politics/2
01 2/05/amendment-one-north-carolina-anti-gay-marriage-measure-passes/.
139 The LGBT Civil Rights Backlash, DAILY Kos (Sept. 30, 2012, 6:28 AM), http://www.
dailykos.com/story/2012/09/30/1137309/-The-LGBT-Civil-Rights-Backlash-with-graphs.
140 Evan McMorris-Santoro, Family Research Council Labeled "Hate Group" by SPLC
over Anti-Gay Rhetoric, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Nov. 24, 2010, 11:18 AM), http://tpmdc.ta
Ikingpointsmemo.com/2010/1 l/family-research-council-labeled-hate-group-by-splc-over-an
ti-gay-rhetoric.php ("What we're saying is these [anti-gay] groups perpetrate hate -just like
those [racist] organizations do.").
141 Neil Broverman, Anti-LGBT Violence Up Significantly, ADVOCATE.COM (July 11,
2011,4:05 PM), http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2011/07/12/lgbt-violence-signi
ficantly (reporting a dramatic surge in anti-LGBT violence, including a twenty-three percent
increase in murders of LGBT people and a thirteen percent increase in total violence from
2009 to 2010); The LGBT Civil Rights Backlash, supra note 139 (documenting that anti-
LGBT violence is particularly on the rise in states that have recognized marriage equality).
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Ninth Circuit on the broad grounds they advocate,142 every state in the country
would have to recognize lesbian and gay marriages sooner rather than later.
This result would significantly raise the stakes of the gay marriage debate at
the national as well as local level. While the conventional wisdom is that the
Supreme Court will not require marriage equality in all jurisdictions this year,
the idea is one whose time is coming more rapidly than anyone thought
possible at the turn of the millennium.
III. How CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION HAS ADVANCED MARRIAGE
EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The foregoing analysis supports the hypothesis I advanced a decade ago:
marriage equality is possible in a jurisdiction that has already taken steps to
accept gay people, first, as noncriminals, then, as equal citizens, and finally, as
people capable of forming families and raising children. 143 This "equality-
practice" model works because jurisdictions that freed gay people early on
from the presumptive criminality of consensual sodomy laws, and then
protected them against workplace and other forms of discrimination, are
jurisdictions where more citizens will be openly LGBT and will feel freer to
form open relationships and raise children. And where there is a greater
number of openly LGBT persons and families, there is a greater demand for
marriage equality and an increasingly muted opposition. Every year there are
more out LGBT people in America, more openly lesbian and gay partnerships
and legal marriages, more children being raised in those families, and fewer
people dedicated to excluding those families from civil marriage.
Have courts contributed to the advance of marriage equality? In my view,
the answer is yes. Although Professor Rosenberg concedes that litigation and
courts have advanced marriage equality in some states, he has not publicly
backtracked on his claim that, on balance, resort to courts has not been
productive for proponents of marriage equality. 144 It is hard to prove him right
or wrong, because there are so many variables and so little empirical data. At
the very least, however, I can show that he and the other backlash theorists
142 See Brief for Appellees at 39-105, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-16696) (arguing that forbidding gay marriage violates due process and equal
protection).
143 William N. Eskridge Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A
Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 641, 647-48
(2000) (discussing the "step-by-step" approach to recognizing marriage equality, including
decriminalization, equalization, and then recognition). Most political scientists put the idea
in polling terms: once a critical mass of voters is open to gay marriage, the political system
will usually respond in some way. See, e.g., Patrick J. Egan, Nathaniel Persily & Wallsten,
Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234, 234-60 (Nathaniel
Persily et al. eds., 2008) (exploring the relationship between demographics and the
increasing support for gay rights).
'" ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 415-19.
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have not recognized the practical effects of judicial decisions on the
advancement of marriage equality.
A. Transformation ofPolitics: Agenda Setting, Reversing the Burden of
Inertia, and Creating Conditions for Falsification ofStereotypes
Conceptually, the primary objection to the Rosenberg backlash analysis has
been that it understates courts' capacity to serve as a catalyst for social change.
This was historian David Garrow's response to Rosenberg's exceedingly
negative analysis of the effect of Brown v. Board of Education on American
public policy. Garrow argued that while it is appropriate to emphasize, as
Rosenberg does, the ways in which white backlash to desegregation
complicated American politics and constitutional remediation, that does not
excuse analysts from giving due emphasis to the ways in which landmark cases
such as Brown transformed politics and contributed to our country's ultimate
repudiation of apartheid and its values. 145 Likewise, Baehr, Baker, and
Goodridge, as well as subsequent court cases, transformed constitutional
politics in ways that go beyond backlash.
1. Agenda Setting
The biggest contribution courts have made to marriage equality is to elevate
the issue on the public law agenda.146 In contrast to the parliamentary systems
in Europe and Canada, our system of state and federal legislation is designed to
make passing legislation on any controversial matter very difficult.147 No
matter how persuasive a case LGBT people presented for family recognition in
the 1990s or early 2000s, the response would have been silence; legislators
have the luxury of ignoring even the best-justified proposals and an incentive
to do so when they would otherwise alienate a significant number of voters.
By contrast, courts generally cannot ignore legal and constitutional claims,
and claims resting upon plausible justifications cannot be dismissed without a
145 David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v.
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 151, 152 (1994).
146 ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 3 ("The same-sex marriage lawsuit
in [Hawaii] was agenda-seizing: it contributed to the politics of recognition by stirring the
aspirations of GLBT people everywhere in the country, while at the same time fueling the
politics of preservation by providing it with an easy object for mobilization on behalf of
traditional family values."); Keck, supra note 13, at 157 (arguing that litigation "often
heighten[s] expectations that further change is possible").
147 Unlike the parliamentary system, legislation in the American system must be ratified
by two differently constituted legislative chambers and then presented to a chief executive
who might veto it, as Governor Schwarzenegger did in 2005 and 2007. In addition to these
constitutional vetoes, there are other "vetogates" in America. See William N. Eskridge Jr.,
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statement of reasons grounded in established legal and constitutional
principles. In the United States, those established constitutional principles
include the "fundamental right to marry," which cannot be denied to couples
without a strong justification.14 8 Especially in jurisdictions where judges have
already been treating LGBT claimants with respect, courts will sympathize
with committed same-sex couples who want the same legal benefits and duties
authorized for straight couples by the marriage laws.
When courts validate equality claims by same-sex couples, as they
increasingly have done in the last decade, they raise marriage equality higher
up on the public agenda. The increased salience of marriage equality is in part
due to backlash politics: lesbian and gay couples, as well as their allies, are
excited about the equality advance, while traditionalists invested in the norm of
one man, one woman marriage are energized into opposition. 149 Typically,
there are numerous political forums for opponents of marriage equality: state
referenda and initiatives to amend state constitutions, Congress, and the federal
process for amending the U.S. Constitution. As Baehr taught us, gay marriage
in one state creates political discourse in other states and in the nation's capital.
But Baehr also inspired thousands of LGBT activists and their straight allies to
initiate lawsuits and political activity to seek the right to marriage in other
states. Without the commotion surrounding Baehr, the plaintiffs in Baker
would not have acted when they did, and without the limited success of Baker,
GLAD would not have pressed Goodridge as early as it did. 50
The increased visibility that judicial decisions have given to marriage
equality has been highly significant beyond its inspiration of new waves of
marriage activists. For one thing, it has revolutionized the English language.
Before Baehr, there was no term for committed relationships between persons
of the same sex: "gay marriage" was, literally and linguistically, an oxymoron.
Once LGBT people came out of the closet as romantic couples, critics have
struggled to deny or disparage their relationships or to impose some kind of
descriptive - but also prescriptive - terminology upon those relationships.'51 In
my lifetime, our society has moved from a language where marriage always
148 See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 124-37
(explaining that denying same-sex couples the right to marry is constitutionally problematic
because substantive due process and equal protection claims are supported by the Supreme
Court's declaration that marriage is a fundamental right.). This was the alternate holding of
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967). Indeed, the Supreme Court even protected
convicted prisoners against being denied the fundamental right to marry in Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
149 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
150 ANDERSEN, supra note 15, at 183-84, 197-98; see also PINELLO, supra note 16, at 190-
93; Keck, supra note 13, at 157-58.
"5 See generally Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story About
Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 385 (1999) (making many brilliant observations about language, marriage, and gay
marriage).
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meant one man, one woman, to a language where gay "marriage" was a special
case or a contested term, to a language where marriage equality means same-
sex as well as different-sex without the quotation marks.
To the extent that marriage equality litigation has contributed to the
normalization of gay marriage as a viable phrase, it has changed the way
people speak and even think about LGBT persons generally. Indeed, even the
resulting backlash politics has contributed to this linguistic evolution. Early
discourse disparaging gay "marriage" - as no different from marrying your cat,
for example - was an acknowledgment that some people viewed lesbians and
gay men as "married," a notion that was inconceivable to Americans in the
1950s. Even more important, as the politics of backlash has evolved, its
adherents have adopted a kinder, gentler oppositional rhetoric that openly
acknowledges that lesbian and gay couples can be "partners" who can be
deemed "spouses" by the law.152 When traditionalist and even homophobic
persons start talking about lesbian and gay "partnerships" and even "spouses,"
much of the struggle for marriage equality has been won.
2. Reversing the Burden of Inertia
Inertia in our political system disadvantages minorities, who usually do not
have the clout to move their agenda through the legislative process, especially
if there is intense opposition. Courts are more attentive to minority claims, but
judges have neither the clout nor the legitimacy to impose an important social
change upon a polity that is unwilling to accept it. There is, however, a large
policy space where a minority cannot secure legislation granting its members
legal rights and benefits, but the minority and its allies can block efforts to take
away rights or benefits that a court or agency grants its members. The question
in politics, as in law, is who bears the burden of inertia? If the minority bears
the burden, it will not be able to secure rights. If those disparaging the minority
bear the burden, the minority will be able to keep rights its members have been
granted.
This is the proper way to understand the Hawaii, Vermont, Massachusetts,
and California marriage equality decisions. Indeed, it is clear that this is the
way the judges themselves understood what they were doing: they were
reversing the burden of political inertia. Because courts were able to do so,
LGBT persons emerged with greater rights. Astonishingly, this was true even
for the Hawaii marriage litigation, as disastrous as it was on so many fronts.
The Hawaii Legislature had no interest in creating legal rights for same-sex
couples in 1993, but that changed once the Baehr litigation placed marriage
equality on the public law agenda. To be sure, the political process reacted
negatively, but in 1997 the legislature did create a new institution granting
152 This was precisely the move made by the supporters of Proposition 8, in their
hallmark cartoon starring the marital family of Tom and Jan, who really like their partnered
neighbors Dan and Michael. See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 126, at 1097-1105
(providing copies of Yes-on-8 materials, including cartoons).
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rights to same-sex couples, reciprocal beneficiary status.153 This was the first
time in American history that a state granted some of the rights of marriage to
lesbian and gay couples. 154 In 2010 Hawaii created yet another new institution,
civil unions, which granted all the legal rights and duties of marriage to same-
sex couples.155 Even more recently, Hawaii has begun considering marriage
equality legislation.'5
Vermont is a more successful example of reversing the burden of inertia,
because the court and the legislature worked very effectively as a team. The
Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Baker explicitly kicked to the Vermont
Legislature the issue of marriage equality. 57 The legislature responded in 2000
with the landmark civil unions law and in 2009 with a marriage equality
law. It is inconceivable that Vermont would have moved so swiftly toward
marriage equality if Baker had not reversed the burden of inertia and provoked
the legislature to create civil unions, and if Goodridge had not created an
example of marriage equality in a neighboring state.
Massachusetts and California represent another variation of the burden-of-
inertia idea. The supreme courts of both states construed the state constitution
to require marriage equality.159 This was a bigger reversal of the burden of
inertia in Massachusetts than in California, for those wishing to amend the
state constitution in California bear a lighter burden than those in
Massachusetts.160 Nonetheless, in both states the supreme court opinions were
not the final word on marriage equality. After exhaustive debate,
Massachusetts opponents could not meet their higher burden, while in
California they were able to meet their lighter burden with the passage of
Proposition 8. Proposition 8, in turn, shifted the burden of political inertia back
to the supporters of marriage equality. But a new litigating group responded
with a further trumping move when they initiated the Perry litigation.
153 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (2010).
154 Hawaii's Domestic Partners Law a Bust; Relatively Few Sign up for Country's
Broadest Benefits Package, WASH. PosT, Dec. 25, 1997, at A14 ("Hawaii became the first
state to extend broad rights to domestic partners in July ....
155 HAW. REv. STAT. § 572B-1 (Supp. 2012).
156 Although the Hawaii Legislature declined to consider a bill to legalize gay marriage,
"the bill remains 'alive' through 2014," and has the support of Hawaii Governor
Abercrombie. Statement from Hawaii United for Marriage, HAW. UNITED FOR MARRIAGE,
http://hawaiiunitedformarriage.org/statement-from-hawaii-united-for-marriage/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2013).
1s7 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999).
1 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2010).
159 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
10 Compare CA. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-4, with MASS. CONST. art. XLVII, cl. IV, §§ I-
5.
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3. Creating Conditions for Falsification of Stereotypes
In my view, reversing the burden of inertia and the publicity surrounding
such reversal would not have advanced the cause of marriage equality if only a
few lesbian and gay couples had gotten married or if many of those couples did
so as a joke or as a publicity stunt. As of 2013 every New England state except
Rhode Island recognizes same-sex marriages. Thousands of committed lesbian
and gay couples have joyously celebrated their nuptials in these states, and
they have enjoyed all the happiness and sadness of American families in the
new millennium. This has sparked a revolution in American understandings
about LGBT people, family law, and marriage itself.
This revolution would not have been possible so soon if courts had not
created conditions for falsifying anti-gay prejudices and stereotypes. Anti-gay
prejudice is deeply founded upon the stereotype that "homosexuals" are
selfish, predatory, and promiscuous, precisely the opposite of "married"
heterosexuals.161 In the 1990s most Americans did not take "gay marriage"
seriously because they did not believe "homosexuals" were interested in
lifelong committed relationships and in rearing children. Although this was
patently false in the 1990s, it is only in the new millennium, with marriage
equality spreading swiftly through the country, that the connection between
LGBT people and family has sunk in for many Americans. 162
It is a clich6, but a valid truth, that a person's homophobia is ameliorated by
knowing and working with a lesbian or gay person. 63 Likewise, a person's
hostility to gay marriage is usually ameliorated or even negated by knowing,
working with, or being related to a lesbian or gay person married to someone
of the same sex and raising children in the joint household. With tens of
thousands of lesbians and gay men now married, and about a third of them
raising children, there are now every year millions of micro-interactions
between straight people and married lesbian or gay people.
Once the stereotype of gay people as anti-family erodes, support for
marriage equality ought to increase and opposition ought to become milder.
161 See, e.g., Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class,
34 S. TEX. L. REv. 205, 232 (1993) (listing some common homosexual stereotypes of
"homosexuals").
162 Susan Page, Poll: Attitudes Towards Gays Shifting Fast, USA TODAY (Dec. 5, 2012,
5:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/12/05/poll-from-gay-marriage
-to-adoption-attitudes-changing-fast/1748873/ (reporting the results of a pair of USA
Today/Gallup polls demonstrating increasing support for gay marriage, and providing as an
explanation for the change in attitudes on the issue that "[n]early eight in 10 adults say they
know a relative, friend or co-worker who is gay, and most describe that relationship as a
close one. In the survey of gay men and lesbians, 73% say they are generally open about
their sexual orientation with other people; 26% say they aren't.").
163 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 205 (supporting this idea by explaining
how New York Governor Cuomo was moved by the number of gay couples who sought him
out and by his girlfriend, whose brother is gay).
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Consistent with this hypothesis - but by no means "proving" the hypothesis -
public support for marriage equality has steadily increased since LGBT
lawyers started winning marriage equality cases. Before 1988, gay marriage
was not even worth polling, as pretty much everyone in the country had given
it little thought. When polling did commence in 1988, only twelve percent of
respondents supported the idea. But in less than a decade after polling began,
during the greatest anti-marriage backlash and the enactment of DOMA, more
than twice as many Americans supported the idea.1" As statistician Nate Silver
has documented, opposition to marriage equality declined from almost 70% to
60% between 1996 and 2004 and collapsed to less than 50% by 2012, while
support rose slightly between 1996 and 2004 and topped 50% in some polls by
2012.165 Significantly, Silver's statistical averages reveal that support for
marriage equality did not falter in the wake of DOMA, did not suffer after
Baker, and ultimately soared after Goodridge.166
To be sure, the leading backlash theorists concede that the United States
today is more accepting of LGBT persons and supportive of gay marriage than
it was at the turn of the millennium, but they claim that "these changes are not
primarily the result of litigation. Rather, they are the result of a changing
culture."l 67 Yet the changing culture is itself a product of social movement
litigation, a point not only suggested by the foregoing history and analysis, but
also by empirical work done by Professor Thomas Keck.168
B. Transformation ofSocial Movement Agendas and Goals
Critics have argued that marriage equality litigation has strongly affected the
agenda of the LGBT rights social movement, crowding out other priorities and
'" See Keck, supra note 13, at 165 tbl.2 (documenting the relatively steady advance of
public support for marriage equality, notwithstanding claims of backlash theorists);
Schacter, supra note 13, at 865-68 (critically analyzing the polling data on this issue).
165 Nate Silver, Support for Gay Marriage Outweighs Opposition in Polls, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/support-for-ga
y-marriage-outweighs-opposition-in-polls/.
166 Compare Frank Phillips, Majority in Mass. Poll Oppose Gay Marriage, Bos. GLOBE
(Feb. 22, 2004), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2004/02/22/majority-in-mass-p
ollopposegaymarriage/?page=full (finding that fifty-three percent of the sample opposed
gay marriage), with Massachusetts Voters Happy with Gay Marriage, PUB. POL'Y POLLING
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2012/03/massachusetts-voters-h
appy-with-gay-marriage.html (reporting that only thirty-one percent of voters in
Massachusetts think there should be no legal recognition of gay marriage).
167 ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 415; see also John D'Emilio, Some Lessons from
Lawrence, in THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS IN AMERICA 3, 12 (H.N. Hirsch ed., 2005) ("[T]he
Supreme Court follows rather than leads."); Klarman, supra note 11, at 484-85 ("The shift
in public opinion on this issue ... may suggest that the growing power and pervasiveness of
popular culture is likely to cause public attitudes on sexual orientation to shift faster than
racial and gender attitudes changed in preceding generations.").
161 See Keck, supra note 13.
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even other forms of relationship recognition.' 69 In my view, this is a
misleading charge. Its fundamental error is that it views LGBT movement
lawyers' priorities in simplistic terms, as though lurching from one issue to
another. As Ellen Andersen has demonstrated, since the 1970s LGBT
movement lawyers have acted with an evolving agenda that presses multiple
issues in multiple institutional contexts all the time. 170 And there has always
been a unifying idea for LGBT movement lawyers: sexual and gender
minorities are decent human beings who ought to be treated with the same
dignity and given the same legal rights as all other Americans. Marriage
equality is not only an extension of this core principle, but also has worked to
advance the other items on the so-called "homosexual agenda."
Thus, marriage equality litigation has not squeezed out the primary goals of
the LGBT rights movement. Before 1989 the movement fought for sodomy
reform, anti-discrimination and hate crime laws, and the rights to raise and
adopt children. It is true that marriage equality has eclipsed these other goals in
the public's mind, but it is also true that during the period of marriage
equality's dominance the LGBT rights movement has achieved many of its
goals, well ahead of schedule. Political scientist Thomas Keck summarized the
progress of gay rights between Baehr in 1993 and the California Marriage
Cases: while twenty-three states criminalized consensual sodomy in 1993,
none did so in 2008; while eleven states had hate crimes laws that included
sexual orientation and gender identity, thirty-two had them in 2008; and while
eight states had sexual-orientation employment nondiscrimination laws, twenty
had them in 2008.171
Professor Keck's point is that marriage equality failed to retard progress
toward gay rights across the board. I would go further to argue that marriage
equality litigation actually had the effect of accelerating progress toward
equality for LGBT persons. The most dramatic example of this acceleration is
the demise of consensual sodomy laws. Bowers v. Hardwick, the infamous
Supreme Court decision upholding such laws in 1986, rested importantly on
the Court's surmise that, because there was no connection between
"homosexuality" and family, its previous privacy precedents involving
relationships, family, and marriage were completely off point.172 Concurring,
Justice Lewis Powell - the critical fifth vote to save sodomy laws - wrote in an
169 See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"
79 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1549 (1993); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to
Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9, 14; Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic
Vision for All Our Families & Relationships, BEYONDMARRIAGE.ORG, 1-4 (July 26, 2006),
http://www.beyondmarriage.org/BeyondMarriage.pdf
170 ANDERSEN, supra note 15, at 27-57 (providing an excellent history of the Lambda
Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., the leading LGBT litigation organization and a
major force behind both sodomy reform and marriage equality litigation).
"7 Keck, supra note 13, at 174-75 & tbl.6.
172 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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unpublished draft: "[Homosexual] sodomy is the antithesis of family."1 73 It
was later marriage equality litigation that established the connection that the
Supreme Court majority in Bowers could not imagine. And I believe it made a
difference in the resolution of subsequent constitutional sodomy litigation.
The District of Columbia was the initial mise-en-sc6ne for the marriage
"frontlash," illustrating how the anti-gay rights movement backed away from
antidiscrimination and sodomy opposition in preparation for a battle over
marriage equality. Congress has plenary authority over the liberal District and
has commonly used its authority to disapprove of the District's pro-gay
legislation. For instance, in 1981 the Democratic-controlled House of
Representatives vetoed the District's effort to reform its sex crime law simpl
because the reform would have decriminalized consensual sodomy.
Anticipating DOMA, in 1992 the Democratic-controlled Congress barred the
District from funding its new domestic partnership law.175 In 1993, however,
the District enacted another law decriminalizing consensual sodomy.1 76 This
time, despite full authority to override or defund the law, Congress was silent,
even as the Baehr backlash was building. The new law took effect on July 1,
1994.17n This was a Congress containing Republican Senators Jesse Helms, of
North Carolina, and Trent Lott, of Mississippi, two of the most anti-gay
legislators in American history.178 And yet not a single GOP lawmaker made a
public move to recriminalize homosexual sodomy in the nation's capital. I
understand from inside-the-beltway sources that the GOP leadership made a
decision to give gays a pass on consensual sodomy, as they started to train their
guns on the emerging gay marriage issue.179
The same strategy played out in almost all the constitutional sodomy
litigation after Baehr: religious and political groups opposed to same-sex
marriage did not want to appear anti-gay across the board, and so they
7 ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 276 (alteration in original) (quoting Powell's unpublished
draft of the concurring opinion he ultimately issued).
174 H.R. Res. 208, 97th Cong. (1981); 127 CONG. REc. 22,764-79 (1981) (reprinting
debates concerning the resolution and ultimately recording the vote as 281 in favor of
disapproval, 119 against, and 32 not voting, resulting in a veto which sustained the
criminalization of sodomy in the District).
15 District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-382, 106 Stat. 1422
(1992). Every D.C. appropriations law between 1992 and 2003 included a similar bar.
176 Anti-Sexual Abuse Act of 1994, § 501(b), 42 D.C. Reg. 53, 62 (Jan. 6, 1995).
1' See ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 277-78.
178 Examples of these Senators' anti-gay stances abound. See, e.g., Derrick Z. Jackson,
Op-Ed, Clinton Tests Lott on Gay Ambassador, Bos. GLOBE, Jan. 15, 1999, at A19 (offering
examples of anti-gay statements by Lott and Helms in which gay Americans are compared
to sex addicts and kleptomaniacs and referred to as "'sickening').
179 Even more remarkably, when the Republicans won their next sweeping victory in
congressional races in 2010, they took control of Congress right after the District of
Columbia recognized same-sex marriages; yet there was no serious effort by the
Republicans to override the District's move. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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abandoned or muted their public opposition to sodomy reform in order to focus
their energies against any expansion of marriage. 80 Thus, in the late 1990s in
the Georgia and Arkansas sodomy lawsuits, the Southern Baptist Convention
and other anti-gay groups remained on the sidelines as conservative southern
courts invalidated their states' consensual sodomy laws as inconsistent with
state constitutional precepts.'18 In 1998 when the Rhode Island Legislature
repealed its consensual sodomy law, and in 2002 when the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court construed its sodomy law to be inapplicable to
consensual activities, the Roman Catholic Church likewise remained on the
sidelines.182 In none of these reform efforts did the Baptist Convention or the
Catholic Church alter their moral rejection of consensual sodomy or
homosexual activities, but neither did they work to preserve the anti-gay status
quo. In my view, these examples illustrate how marriage equality not only
expanded rather than contracted the LGBT agenda, but also contracted rather
than expanded the traditional-family-values (TFV) agenda toward gay people.
The effect of marriage equality was most apparent in 2003 when the
Supreme Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.'83 Dozens of amicus
briefs sought to inform the Justices' deliberations in the case, and it is
remarkable how many "conservative" groups filed briefs in support of the
LGBT challengers. Arguing for, constitutional invalidation of the Texas
Homosexual Conduct Law were not only briefs from the libertarian Cato
Institute, the pro-gay Log Cabin Republicans, and former GOP Senator Alan
Simpson's Republican Unity Coalition, but also a brief signed by twenty-nine
churches, arguing from a faith-based human dignity perspective.184 Notably
180 For early and explicit public suggestions along these lines, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
SEX AND REASON 309-14 (1992) (arguing that sodomy law reform is inherently different
than the positive enactment of marriage equality laws because the former would only signal
that homosexual relationships are not criminal while the latter would "plac[e] a stamp of
approval" on the relationships, an act which the author holds to be unjustified and
misleading); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and Sexual "Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1049, 1052-53, 1075-76 (1994) (distinguishing an outdated ideology which sought to
wholly criminalize homosexuality from a newer ideology which sees regulation of private
activity as bad but control of activities in the "public realm" as proper, ultimately
concluding on this basis that outlawing truly private acts (sodomy) is different from
restricting entrance into a public relationship (marriage)).
181 ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 290-92 (recounting the facts and resolution of Powell v.
State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1988), the 1998 litigation which overruled Georgia's consensual
sodomy statute); id. at 294-98 (describing the preparation for and procedural history of
Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002), Arkansas litigation occurring from 1998 to
2000 and resulting in that state's decriminalization of consensual sodomy).
182 Id. at 292-93.
1 539 U.S. 558, 566-67, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers, in part based upon that
decision's failure to appreciate that consensual sodomy could be the basis for a personal
"relationship" and an "enduring" bond).
184 ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 321.
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absent were briefs opposing constitutional sodomy reform from the Roman
Catholic Church, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the Church of Jesus
Christ of the Latter-Day Saints. This was no indication that any of these
prominent religious institutions acquiesced to or agreed with a constitutional
right to engage in consensual sodomy, but their silence was evidence that these
faith groups had refocused their efforts onto the marriage issue and, as part of
that process, had abandoned their earlier strong public opposition to sodomy
reform. 185
On the eve of Goodridge, with the Baehr backlash still fresh and the Baker
backlash still unfolding, a very conservative Supreme Court freed lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals from their status as presumptive criminals in Lawrence.
And the reasoning of that decision reveals, on its face, the direct effect of the
marriage equality movement on evaluation of its constitutional sodomy claim.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion started with a bang by denouncing the
manner in which the Bowers Court had framed the constitutional issue as
simply a right to engage in certain conduct:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers
and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a
particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes
185 This shift in position was not simply political, especially in the case of the Roman
Catholic Church. Since the 1970s the Church had taken the position that discrimination
against gay people because of their sexual orientation was morally wrong. NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, To LIVE IN CHRIST JESUS (1976), reprinted in
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE MAGISTERIUM: DOCUMENTS FROM THE VATICAN AND U.S.
BISHOPS 1975-1985, at 9 (John Gallagher ed., 1986) (offering an excerpt from a 1976
Catholic publication stating that "[h]omosexuals, like everyone else, should not suffer from
prejudice against their basic human rights"); Letter from the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual
Persons, para. 10 (Oct. 1, 1986), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregati
ons/cfaith/documents/rc-con cfaith doc_198_61001_homosexual-personsen.html. As
constitutional challenges made it increasingly clear that state sodomy laws only had bite as
instruments of civil discrimination against gay people, however, the traditional Catholic
support for consensual sodomy laws became more equivocal. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note
180, at 1051-53 (suggesting, in an article written by a leading Catholic intellectual, that
consensual sodomy laws might be repealed for the practical reason that sodomy is a private
act outside the accepted purview of state regulation, but still advocating against laws which
would support or suggest agreement with homosexuality in a public forum). To have "gone
after" gay people on both sodomy and marriage was a stance that likely did not appeal to the
Church leadership in the United States and, in my view, explains why the Church was
largely silent on sodomy reform.
3 19
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals.186
If there were any doubt that marriage equality litigation was implicated in
Lawrence, it was removed by Justice Scalia's explosive dissenting opinion.
Like an Old Testament prophet, Justice Scalia foresaw and lamented that the
Court's reasoning, which assured gay people a constitutional right to engage in
consensual private relations, also logically should assure them of the right to
marry.187 Stoically, the Court ignored Justice Scalia's thundering prophesy.
C. Lowering the Stakes ofPolitics by Marginalizing Outlier Perspectives
Consider a final way in which constitutional litigation has advantaged
LGBT persons as well as, I submit, TFV persons and the country as a whole.
As I have suggested in this Article, backlash politics is tied to issues that
implicate people's heartfelt identities and their intense devotion to expressive
symbols of public values. Ultimately, it is the issue and the state's resolution of
that issue that are most important, not the forum in which the issue is resolved.
As political scientists have long opined, the democratic process cannot resolve
small "c" constitutional issues that intensely and evenly divide the polity. To
declare a group as the winner for such issues not only provokes a politics of
backlash but threatens the viability of the democratic process. 88
This is the central reason why the Federal Marriage Amendment was a
terrible idea; it would have declared TFV Americans the winners and
disrespected LGBT Americans. It is also the central reason why the Supreme
Court should decide the appeal in Perry on narrow grounds, either dismissing
the appeal on grounds of standing or affirming the Ninth Circuit based upon its
reasoning that the take-back of important marriage rights did not satisfy the
rational basis standard. Declaring a national constitutional right to marriage
equality now would declare LGBT Americans the winners and would
disrespect many TFV Americans. The best way for the democratic process to
deal with small "c" constitutional issues that intensely but evenly divide the
polity is to allow local compromises and continued debate until the political
culture itself reaches some kind of rough consensus.
The more general point is that the governmental process must not raise the
stakes for small "c" constitutional issues, as they are already too high. This is a
dynamic process. In 1993, Baehr was a judicial blunder both because neither
the state of Hawaii nor the country was ready to engage in a policy debate
about same-sex marriage, and because the Republican Party, with a big boost
from the Clinton Administration, fanned irrational fears that Hawaii would
' Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. I cannot name another Supreme Court majority decision
that disrespected a precedent of the Court by disparaging the previous Court's statement of
the legal or constitutional issue at suit.
1 Id. at 602-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"8 DAHL, supra note 83, at 93-99; cf PRZEWORSKI, supra note 79, at 37.
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become a center for national gay marriage. By leaving the remedy to the
legislative process, Baker was a smarter move, as it managed to mitigate high-
stakes opposition, while still advancing what the judges considered to be an
important constitutional principle. The Goodridge Court ran a large risk of
raising the stakes of the still-fresh marriage equality issue by insisting on
marriage equality, but the risk was ameliorated by Massachusetts's affirmative
history of support for gay rights and by the extensive processes made available
for opponents to engage on this issue. The California Marriage Cases ran a
much lower risk of harmful stakes-raising because gay marriage had already
been normalized for many citizens and because opponents had an immediate
and effective outlet for their political pushback. In 2013 the U.S. Supreme
Court will be running a significant risk of raising the stakes of gay marriage if
it issues an opinion all but requiring all states to recognize marriage equality.
Further, there is no pressing need for Supreme Court action, in contrast to the
situation in Goodridge, for the issue to continue its "progress" toward broader
public acceptance or acquiescence.
Conversely, the government ought to do what it can to lower the stakes for
small "c" constitutional issues, and I maintain that courts can and do play a
modest but potentially productive role in this regard.189 Consider a few
examples that bear on marriage equality. For small "c" constitutional issues,
the stakes get higher when an impassioned or prejudiced majority demonizes
and imposes major harms on a minority in a robust and public politics of
disgust. Especially when the minority is a productive group of decent people, it
is insanity for a country to allow this to happen.190 In Romer v. Evans,'9' the
Supreme Court struck down a sweeping anti-gay initiative that rested upon
lurid claims about "homosexuals" and that seemed to carve LGBT people out
of the ordinary protections entailed by the rule of law.192 The unmistakable
message of Romer was that TFV zealots who insisted on demonizing gay
people ran the risk that judges would strike down their proposals based on
'" William N. Eskridge Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes ofPolitics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005).
190 I do not believe it is far-fetched to say that Spain's persecution and then expulsion of
the Jews in the fifteenth century, and France's persecution and then expulsion of the
Huguenots in the seventeenth century were not only unjust to the persecuted minority but
calamitous for those countries. See generally NORMAN ROTH, CONVERSOS, INQUISITION, AND
THE EXPULSION OF THE JEWS FROM SPAIN (1995); Keith P. Luria, Conversion and Coercion:
Personal Conscience and Political Conformity in Early Modern France, 12 MEDIEVAL
HisT. J. 221 (2009). Persecuting and imprisoning gay people during the anti-homosexual
Kulturkampf of 1947 to 1961 was, in my view, harmful to America for similar reasons. See
generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Democracy, Kulturkamphf and the Apartheid of the
Closet, 50 VAND. L. REv. 419 (1997).
"' 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
192 For a brilliant analysis of the prudence and caution underlying this decision, which
sounds radical and visionary in tone, see Louis Michael Seidman, Romer 's Radicalism: The
Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67.
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Romer's rejection of anti-gay "animus" as a defensible basis for modem
legislation or, as in Romer, voter initiatives. The politics of disgust, at least as
applied to LGBT people, was thus rendered unconstitutional.
Romer and the cultural shifts it reflected contributed to a kinder, gentler
dialectic on the part of TFV organizations and supporters. Handed down in
May 1996, just as Congress was debating DOMA, Romer had an immediate
effect on national political discourse about gay marriage. After Romer, most
DOMA supporters found it necessary to present their arguments as part of a
genuine policy debate and not just an exercise in denigrating lesbian and gay
couples. Hence, the House Judiciary Committee Report explicitly discussed
Romer and explained why DOMA was motivated by important policy goals
and not by disapproved "animus."l 93
Romer also exercised an important influence on voter initiatives to bar
same-sex marriages. The 2000 and 2008 anti-gay-marriage equality initiatives
in California left the state's domestic partnership law in place, with the
initiatives' supporters toning down their rhetoric and abandoning the
intemperate gay bashing common to earlier anti-gay initiatives in both
California and other western states.194 The contribution of Romer to a more
civilized and less incendiary discourse about an important small "c"
constitutional issue is perhaps modest, but it is nonetheless solid and illustrates
how the Court has contributed to lowering the stakes of marriage equality
politics.
Zealots supporting gay rights are also sometimes intemperate in their
rhetoric regarding religion-based opposition. Just as many TFV Americans
have strongly negative feelings about gay people, many LGBT Americans
have strongly negative feelings about religious institutions. One fear that
religious persons and organizations have is that marriage equality will impose
upon churches the duty to perform gay marriage ceremonies or, more
plausibly, to provide marital benefits to lesbian and gay persons who are their
employees. Legislatures have tried, with some success, to ameliorate
traditionalist backlash by exempting religious institutions from the
implications of marriage equality, such as waiving requirements that same-sex
spouses be included in an employees' health insurance benefits package. 195
The ability to accommodate the most important needs of faith-based
communities is one reason why legislatures are, generally, better institutions to
deliver marriage equality in most states where that is possible as a political
matter.
193 H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 31-33 (1996).
194 Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage Cases, supra note 16, at 1824-33, 1834 tbl.2
(tracing the evolution of anti-gay rhetoric in California initiatives in both narrative and
graphical form).
195 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception,
Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C.
L. REv. 1417, 1433-45 (2012).
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Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a barrier to the
possibility that marriage equality and other pro-gay measures will authorize the
state to intercede against anti-gay "animus" within religious institutions. In
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, a
unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause requires the
federal government to exempt religious "ministers" and other officials from the
requirements of anti-discrimination laws.196 Under Hosanna-Tabor religious
organizations are probably protected from sacrificing their religious principles
as regards lesbian and gay ministers and other officials: churches can decline
to hire such individuals, can discharge employees they discover to be lesbian
or gay, and can very probably decline to provide such persons with marriage-
based benefits even if retained as employees. 19 7 Although the reach of the
decision's ministerial exemption remains unclear, it is apparently quite
broad. 198 In my view, Hosanna-Tabor, like legislative exemptions, has the
salutary effect of lowering the stakes of marriage equality by providing
normative room for traditionalists to avoid its implications in their religious
sanctuaries.
196 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012).
11 Id. (ruling that the "ministerial exception" applies to employment discrimination
cases and leaving open for future consideration the full scope of its application).
198 See id. at 711-16 (Alito, J., concurring) (articulating a broad understanding of who
might be a "minister" falling under this constitutionally required exemption).
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